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what appeared to be within the blink of an eye, financial markets buckled,
mighty economies previously relied on as global economic engines retreated,
and the scale of governments’ interventions made some wonder if we were to
witness the end of capitalism. The magnitude of this blow served to mark a
sharp contrast between the recent past and the present; and when addressing
just about any economic or social matter today, most of us are compelled to
reference the before and the after of the economic meltdown. 
In Canadian context, the ‘before’ consisted of a 17-year recession-free economy
featuring modest yet steady income growth, high demand for labour, expanding
business activity, favourably high commodity prices and a strong demand for
Canadian exports. The ‘after’ is still in the making and continues to challenge
world economies as experts wrestle with its evolution. This uncertainty leaves
hope that the economic recovery will be short and easy, but it also leaves 
us with a discomfort that financial market sophistication combined with 
redefined business culture can in fact threaten the well-being of individuals,
families, organizations, and governments alike. 
An earlier work of the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada –
“Where Has the Money Gone” – reveals how the dynamic of the Canadian
households’  use  of  financing  has  changed  over  the  years.  Extending  the
hypothesis, we today see that individuals typically respond to the offerings of
the financial institutions that finance them and the governments that affect 
collective policy; where immediacy and speculation seem to trump persistence
and conservatism. 
As we make our way through this recession, we have come to appreciate that
some corrections were in order. Our goal in this paper has not been to revisit
what  has  happened,  or  to  examine  individual  and  financial  institution 
behaviour, but rather, to deliberate some of the stimulus measures introduced
by government. This is deemed important because such measures serve to
prop up consumer confidence while bolstering the buffers in other sectors of




Recognizing that Canada’s exposure has been moderate relative to the experience
of some other countries and that governments’ motivation to stem the potential
fallout has been absolute, the Certified General Accountants Association 
commissioned this elementary review to ascertain the nature and foreseeable
effectiveness of some of stimulus programs engineered. In so doing, our 
intention has not been to endorse a formal position, but to arouse curiosity and
to identify matters of ongoing diligence. In that spirit, the Association is
motivated primarily by continued dialogue and offers this perspective; to the
extent that it can contribute to the important work of government and reasonably
serve to encourage sustainability.  
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada9
With a softening of labour markets, declining business activity, a downgrading
of asset values, and rising public debt, it simply becomes much more difficult
for a number of sectors to absorb the negative developments of the fall of
2008. In that spirit, the Association does applaud the governments’ swiftness
in initiating a broad-based set of programs to stem the economic fallout. While
we are uncertain of what the future holds, it is abundantly clear that our nation’s
economic challenges commanded additional stimulus; both in the form of 
customary measures and of extraordinary measures.    
Customary measures associated with fiscal or public policy such as the like of
tax reduction, health care, safety and security, financial support, research, and
the environment may in fact never have been more important. These will endure. 
The extraordinary stimulus measures, defined herein as those possessing 
particular magnitude, encompassing characteristics outside of typical budget
initiatives, or temporary in nature include the:
•  Insured Mortgage Purchase Program
•  Business Credit Availability Program
•  Canadian Secured Credit Facility
•  New 10-year Canada Mortgage Bond
•  Loans to the automobile industry
•  Home Renovation Tax Credit
•  Infrastructure Stimulus Fund
•  Personal Income Tax relief for all taxpayers
•  Loans to Municipalities (under actions to stimulate housing constructions)
•  Improving Infrastructure at Universities and Colleges.
Extraordinary stimulus measures are generally received in the positive with
the caveat however that they are accessible, merit-based, responsive, and are
subject to parliamentary approval. Oftentimes forgotten as times improve, the
government will be called upon to monitor the performance of these temporary
measures; but perhaps more importantly will be called upon to prevent 
structural deficits to emerge from the existence of such measures. Reasonably
then, we should include ‘timeliness’ and ‘foreseeable exodus’ to our list of
desired characteristics. 
Introduction
It is abundantly clear




A reasonable challenge with some of these measures is that some of the costs
of ‘credit easing’ measures will not be manifested in the public budgetary
forecasts unless and until they materialize. Along with other difficulties 
discussed, it is consequentially impractical to assign a true predicted cost to
extraordinary stimulus measures. 
In evaluating the merit of the extraordinary stimulus measures pursued, the
loans to the automobile industry conceivably pose the greatest apprehension.
Given the industry’s relative size and its propensity to contract, we are compelled
to concede that a number of factors and influences are at work; with ample
persuasion in the form of actions taken by our neighbours to the south.  
As we navigate the current recession and wrestle with its lingering effects, we
would remind Canadians that it will take some time to return to pre-recession
conditions. In our trajectory, it is important that we not disproportionally lose
sight of other important issues such as productivity, innovation, our pension
systems, the environment, and health care. If we are to manage this event with
optimal success, we must do so with a view to sustainability and one which
embraces the spirit of intergenerational equity. To that end, a balanced
approach to planned deficit reduction and debt stabilization is made all the
more germane today than it was a short year ago.  
In evaluating the merit
of the extraordinary
stimulus measures 




In the fall of 2009, the Certified General Accountants Association set out to
examine government stimulus measures as introduced to stem the financial
crisis emanating from the fall of 2008. The analysis aimed primarily to identify
the measures that are extraordinary in nature and scope, and at assessing the
inherent abilities of those measures. Recognising the limitations in assessing
the effectiveness of such measures and the subjectivity associated with
hypothesis of the asserted qualities, focus spontaneously shifts to identifying
what might be viewed as the least strategic of the measures and the concerns
posed by pursuing the automobile industry stimulus measures. 
While the following pages explore a number of themes and approaches, 
our findings essentially concentrate on the three most salient groupings:
(i) extraordinary stimulus measures; (ii) concerns regarding the auto industry
rescue; and, (iii) concerns regarding the federal debt.
Extraordinary Stimulus Measures
The estimated cost of Canada’s stimulus measures is fairly high when compared
to other countries, particularly when we discern that Canada has avoided the
housing market meltdown and exposure to toxic assets as experienced else-
where. However, it is difficult to identify the exact price tag associated with
the total of the measures due to inclusion of credit easing measures. Primarily
involving guarantees and investment, these measures simply remain outside the
total costs of the stimulus package unless or until they mature into liabilities. 
For the purposes of this paper, extraordinary measures are defined as measures
that extend and call upon public financial resources on a scale surpassing that
of the usual range of government spending (i.e. greater than $1 billion) and/or
are implemented in the areas outside of traditional revenue or spending budget
initiatives that focus primarily on tax reduction, investment in health, education,
social and national security, and aiming to advance science, technology and
cleaner environment. Ten such measures were identified including the Insured
Mortgage Purchase Program, the Business Credit Availability Program, the
Canadian Secured Credit Facility, the New 10-year Canada Mortgage Bond,
Loans to the auto industry, the Home Renovation Tax Credit, the Infrastructure
Stimulus  Fund,  Personal  Income  Tax  relief  for  all  taxpayers,  Loans  to
Municipalities (under actions to stimulate housing constructions), and Improving
Infrastructure at Universities and Colleges.
Executive Summary 112
Extraordinary stimulus measures were examined across a number of criteria
deemed essential for assuring that fairness and effectiveness are safeguarded
when stimulating the economy or market activity through the use of public
money. Among those criteria are accessibility, merit, disclosure of possible
fiscal impacts, and parliamentary approval.
Encouragingly, extraordinary measures related to tax relief and infrastructure
improvements score well relying on these criteria. Taken together however, 
the main shortcoming of some of the ‘credit easing’ measures relates to the
appreciation that their potential negative influence is not manifested in the
budgetary forecasts, nor is the Parliament given reasonable opportunity to
debate and influence the specifics of these measures. As will be seen, loans to
the auto industry are assigned the lowest grade due to their inability to meet
the identified criteria while bearing a significant price. 
Concerns Associated with the Auto Industry Rescue
The financial assistance package provided by the federal government to the
Canadian automobile industry consisted of three distinct elements: (i) Interim
loans for selected automakers, (ii) a Canadian Warranty Commitment Program,
and  (iii)  Expansion  of  the  Account  Receivable  Insurance  Program.  The 
governments of Canada and Ontario committed some $14.6 billion in interim
loans to General Motors of Canada Limited and Chrysler Canada Inc. with a
share of $9.7 billion and $4.9 billion respectively. For some, the act of 
rescuing the automobile industry invokes mild umbrage. For others, the sheer
magnitude  of  the  intervention  seems  to  further  underscore  how  public
intervention serves to upset the principles of free market enterprise.
Consideration of the rationale used by the government to bail out the auto
industry may suggest that (i) the auto industry is just one of a number of other
industries supported by the government, but its size is critical to the economy;
(ii) the bailout will ensure that Canada’s current share of the North American
auto industry is preserved; and (iii) that government action did preserve jobs.
An analysis of these three areas reveals:
(i) A strong imbalance in the scale of the supportive measures provided to
the auto industry and to the other key sectors of the economy. The auto
industry
1 contributes some 2.1% of the total industry GDP with some 
18 other industries individually contributing more to GDP than the auto
industry. Contribution of the auto industry to total GDP is also some-
what less than the combined role of the other key sectors supported by
the  government.  In  short,  auto  industry  employment  accounted  for
only 1.0% of all employed Canadians in October 2007. 
1  For the purpose of this paper, the auto industry is understood as comprising of three industry groups:
motor vehicle manufacturing, motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing, and motor vehicle parts 
manufacturing. See Section 3.2 for more details.13
The impact that the changes in auto industry production may bring to
GDP and to employment (measured through GDP and employment
multipliers)  are  among  the  lowest  among  all  other  industries.  For
instance, a $1 change in output production in some 108 Canadian
industries would be associated with a greater impact on Canada’s
GDP  than  a  similar  change  in  the  production of motor vehicle 
manufacturing.
(ii)  The tendency to locate near the final market and the slow (or no)
growth in the North America’s vehicle demand led to a shrinking
share of the world vehicle production that takes place in the North
America. At the same time, the rapidly developing middle class in the
new  fast-growing  economies  such  as  China  and  India  will  most 
probably focus expansion efforts of the auto industry in the regions of
near proximity to those countries. As such, the nominal volume of
vehicle  production  that  takes  place  in  North America  is  likely  to
decline in the years to come. 
The  Canadian  auto  industry  has  traditionally  benefited  from  two 
competitive advantages – the low Canadian dollar in relation to the U.S.
dollar and a highly qualified and available labour force at affordable
cost.  These  advantages  have  been  slowly  but  steadily  eroded  by
Canadian  dollar  appreciation  and  relatively increasing  unit  labour
cost in Canadian manufacturing. Saturation of  North America’s
auto market makes the shifts in vehicle production and employment
within North America a “zero-sum game” with some places gaining
in production capacity at the expense of others.
(iii)  Despite the billions of dollars injected into the automobile industry,
the industry’s employment sustained one of the highest pan-Canadian
contractions between August 2008 and August 2009. It was unsurprisingly
one of the leading job loosing industries in Ontario as well.
A ‘picking the winner’ industry strategy is associated with uncertainty regarding
policy-makers’ ability to identify the “right” industry for intervention, and the
suboptimal allocation of productive capacity within that industry. The empirical
studies conducted for Asia suggest that the establishment of industrial policy
has made only minor contribution to overall economic growth.
Recognizing that time was of the essence, a certain erosion of government
transparency  and  accountability  was  nevertheless  observed.  The  publicly-
available bailout documents did not stipulate clearly the expected outcomes 
of the financial support, nor did they include specific indicators to be measured
in determining progress towards stated objectives. Moreover, the potential14
impact of the bailout loans on the budgetary balance was not fully discussed
in the initial budgetary documents even though the loans were provided
through the Canada Account which is typically used to support higher risk
non-commercial transactions. 
Concerns Associated with the Level of Federal Debt
As the large number of stimulus measures (particularly those associated with
credit easing) are provided in the form of loans, guarantees and investments,
their potential impact is not currently reflected in the forecasts of the federal
budgetary revenues and expenditures. This raises certain concern regarding
possible budgetary developments and a corresponding lack of public awareness.
It is important to acknowledge that a recovery of living standards (measured
as GDP per capita) to pre-recession levels may take several times longer than
the duration of the recession itself. Canada’s recovery from the current (2008-
2009) recession may further be exacerbated by a number of factors including
low  prospects  for  export  expansion,  reduced  household  consumption,  and
decreased capacity to exploit traditional monetary and fiscal policies aimed at
boosting the economy. 
Although the current deficit projections do not resemble the magnitudes of
federal deficits of the 1980s, the starting point of the current deficit cycle is
somewhat weaker than that of the previous cycle; particularly when it comes
to the relative level of federal debt. 
The current budgetary 5-year projections may not be fully reflective of the
possible impact of the economic stabilizers on federal revenue and spending.
If  that  is  the  case,  the  overestimation  of  revenues  and/or  underestimation 
of expenses may not only increase the deficit in a particular year but may 
also lead to increasing fiscal pressures in other years through increased debt
service charges. 
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) conservative estimates suggest that
the  expected  fiscal  cost  of  Canada’s  contingent  liabilities  (i.e.  guarantees 
provided to the banking sector) may be as high as 3.2% of GDP annually over
the  next  five  years. The  fiscal  impact  of  measures  associated  with  assets 
purchasing  will  critically  depend  on  the  realization  value  of  the  acquired
assets and/or the extent to which these assets will hold their value. IMF 
estimates Canada’s recovery rate at 59.7%.15
Inaccuracy of the budget forecasting may be another factor that can increase
the actual size of the budget deficit and debt compared to those currently
anticipated. Over a more long-term horizon, such ‘traditional’ fiscal pressure
as exerted by aging population may also affect the level of debt significantly.
According  to  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development
(OECD) forecasts, age-related government spending may account for 26.6%
of GDP in 2050, a sharp contrast to the 17.9% level registered in 2000.
The economic literature does not offer us conclusive insight into the question
regarding the optimal level of government debt – in fact, a number of theories
co-exist  on  the  subject. The  level  of  Canada’s  federal  debt  has  improved 
significantly in recent years and the current scenario, as well as the five-year
forecasts do not necessarily translate into an alarming condition. In practical
terms,  though,  increasing  debt  service  charges  may  reduce  significantly 
government’s flexibility to allocate revenues towards carefully chosen priorities.
Based on these findings, it is reasonable to espouse not less than five conclusions.
First, one particular stimulus measure – the support for the auto industry –
stands out in terms of the level of apprehension associated with its quality.
Second, there is reason to doubt that the financial support to the auto industry
was commensurate with its relative size or its comparative importance to the
Canadian  economy.  Third,  based  on  the  approach  employed  in  providing
financial support, there is opportunity to enhance government transparency
and  accountability.  Fourth,  the  combination  of  economic  uncertainty  and 
the already existing fiscal pressures of an aging population may exacerbate
significantly the actual levels of federal deficit and debt. And lastly, a balanced
approach to planned federal deficit reduction and federal debt stabilization
may once again be desirable.1617
The extraordinary events of the second half of 2008 were primarily focused
within the financial system; however, the ripple effects of those events were
felt across the Canadian and global economies. As such, the economic stimulus
package provided by the federal government sought to aggregate a sophisticated
blend of measures aimed at multiple areas of the economy including the financial
sector itself as well as at certain relationships that unite the financial sector
and the real economy. 
A variety of ways exist to categorize the measures included in the stimulus
package. For instance, the measures can be thought of as monetary versus fiscal,
immediate versus gradual, national versus international, etc. Such categorization,
though, does not necessarily reflect or restrict itself to the crisis nature of the
measures as similar hierarchy can be adopted for any period; even in years in
which no defined crisis events occurred. On balance, governments continually
provide certain levels of stimulus to the economy through budget spending,
tax expenditure, and changes in taxation rates. However, such stimulus may
typically be of a smaller scale, more targeted, and generally less publicized.
What is truly unique about the economic stimulus measures associated with
the 2008 crisis is the “extraordinary” nature and scope of some of those measures.
2.1. Chronology of Introducing Stimulus Measures
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis and the global economic downturn,
three stages may be identified in the evolution of events: a slowly unfolding
financial instability during 2007 and the first half of 2008; a rapid escalation
of credit apprehension and market failure and the recession transpiring over
the second half of 2008 and the beginning of 2009; and, a slowly emerging
economic recovery in the second half of the 2009. With the introduction of
stimulus measures in Canada, the domestic scenario has similarly experienced
multi-phase progress which may be chronologically identified as (i) fall 2007
to mid 2008, (ii) fall 2008, (iii) January 2009, and (iv) post-January 2009. 
In the fall of 2007, stimulus measures began with the Bank of Canada providing
additional liquidity in the markets, as well as expanding the list of eligible
securities  for  term  purchase  and  resale  agreements  (PRAs).  Budget  2008
tabled in February 2008 expanded the authoritative powers of the Bank of
“Extraordinary” Economic 
Stimulus Measures 2




2008 crisis is the 
“extraordinary” nature
and scope of some of
those measures18
Canada – to enhance its ability to support the stability of the financial system
and to respond more promptly and effectively to an economic crisis, should it
arise. In June 2008, the Canadian Mortgage Bond (CMB) program was expanded
through a multi-billion CMB issue.
In the fall of 2008, the federal government used the Economic and Fiscal
Statement to announce a number of new actions to strengthen Canada’s 
economic and financial fundamentals. These measures included the expansion
of the Insured Mortgage Purchase Program (which was first introduced in
October 2008), establishment of the Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility, and
introduction of a CMB with a 10-year maturity. In addition, the government
expanded  the  borrowing  capacity  of  its  Crown  corporations  –  Export
Development Canada and Business Development Bank of Canada, and made
available (in partnership with the Ontario government) multi-billion interim
loans to General Motors of Canada Limited and Chrysler Canada Inc. Another
notable initiative introduced in the fall of 2008 was temporary solvency funding
relief for federally regulated defined-benefit pension plans.
In January 2009, the federal government introduced a broad range of stimulus
measures under the Economic Action Plan which was imbedded into Budget
2009. The budget documents presented measures as grouped into five broad
categories: (i) improving access to financing; (ii) actions to help Canadians
and stimulate spending; (iii) infrastructure investments; (iv) actions to stimulate
housing constructions; and, (v) actions to support businesses and communities.
Among  the  specific  measures,  the  most  notable  were  the  creation  of  the
Canadian Secured Credit Facility, the Business Credit Availability Program,
the  Canadian  Life  Insurers Assurance  Facility,  expansion  of  Employment
Insurance  benefit  entitlements,  implementation  of  a  temporary  Home
Renovation Tax Credit, and establishment of the Infrastructure Stimulus Fund.
The budget also granted new authority to the Minister of Finance to enter into
transactions  that  promote  financial  stability  and  maintain  efficient  and 
well-functioning markets, and expanded certain functions of the Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation. 
The post-January 2009 measures were primarily focused on further expansion
of the financial support to the auto industry. In the spring of 2009, the federal
and Ontario governments extended interim loans and medium-term restructuring
loans to General Motors of Canada Limited and Chrysler Canada Inc. 19
2.2. Price Tag of the Stimulus Measures
Although the list of stimulus measures is extensive, most of the measures 
may be assigned to one or both of the two categories; fiscal stimulus and credit
easing. This duality makes it difficult to determine the price associated with
the overall stimulus package or some of the individual measures. While fiscal
measures  are  typically  reflected  in  the  budget  documents  through  either
changes in revenues or expenses, credit easing measures often represent a 
temporary lending or guarantees which are not recorded as part of budgetary
components in that fiscal year. However, in the years that follow, credit easing
measures may under certain circumstances become a government expense,
generate income, or remain neutral when it concerns the public finances. 
Moreover, a simple dollar amount would not be able to properly capture how
the scope of the measures compares to the overall size of the economy. A 
relative consideration of the costs associated with the measures may then be a
more  appropriate  approach.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  relative  approach  of 
measuring the cost, Figure 1 presents estimated costs of the stimulus measures
implemented by some advanced countries. Although it has repeatedly been
acknowledged that Canada managed to avoid housing market problems and
high exposure to toxic assets seen in other countries, Canada’s price of the
stimulus  measures  is  fairly  high  compared  to  that  of  other  countries.  For
instance, Canada has the third highest estimated costs of both the stimulus
package and the total support to the financial sector compared to other countries.
Moreover, the upfront government financing provided by Canada is second
only to the United Kingdom (Figure 1).
Canada’s price of the
stimulus measures is 
fairly high compared to
that of other countries20
Figure 1 – Estimated Costs of Fiscal Stimulus 
Packages – Selected Countries
Note: Top graph: Estimated costs exclude financial sector support measures. Bottom graph: The 
total support to the financial sector is understood as a sum of capital injections, asset purchases and direct 
lending by the treasury, liquidity provision and other support provided by the Central Bank, and guarantees 
for financial sector liabilities.
Source: Top graph: International Monetary Fund (2009). Companion Paper—The State of Public 
Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, Table 13.
Bottom graph: International Monetary Fund (2009). Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and 
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2.3. Business-as-Usual vs. Extraordinary Measures
The broad range of stimulus measures may also be categorized into ‘business-
as-usual’ or customary and ‘extraordinary measures’. The business-as-usual
measures are fiscal and other public policy measures that are similar in nature
and  monetary  scope  to  budget  initiatives  implemented  in  other  years.
Extraordinary measures, alternatively, are measures that necessitated the use
of financial resources in much larger scale than the usual range of government
spending and/or are implemented in the areas where the government has not
typically been an active economic agent in recent years.
As seen from Figure 2, federal government budget initiatives introduced over
the past 10 years have primarily been focused in such areas as tax reductions,
improving health care and safety of Canadians, enhancing security, providing
financial support for education and families, supporting research in science
and  technology,  aiming  to  achieve  cleaner  environment,  working  closer 
with  Aboriginal  communities,  and  providing  funds  for  international 
assistance. In some years, the government initiatives also aimed at improving
physical infrastructure, supporting small business and traditional industries,
and supporting culture and communities. These areas may be identified as
business-as-usual areas of the government intervention, or support, provided
to the economy.
Figure 2 – Public Policy Areas of Federal Government Budget 
Initiatives, 1998-99 to 2008-09 Fiscal Years
Tax Relief xxxxxx x xx
Investing in Health xx xxxxx xx
Providing Security and Defence xxxxxxxx x
Investing in Canadians xxxxxxxx x
Improving Environment xxxxxxxx x
Investing in Science and Innovation xx xxx xx
Providing International Assistance xx xxx x x
Strengthening Partnerships with 
Aboriginal Communities xx x x x x
Investing in Infrastructure xxx xx x
Strengthening Entrepreneurial 
Advantage and Effective Markets xxxxx
Supporting Communities  xx x x x
Supporting Culture and Sports xx x x
Supporting Traditional Industries xxx x
Source: Based on information presented in Budget Plans for corresponding years. CGA-Canada analysis.




















The broad range of 
stimulus measures may
be categorized into 
‘business-as-usual’ and
‘extraordinary’ measures22
The budget cost of the initiatives introduced in the past 10 years varied 
significantly from year to year and across different areas. Table 1 presents
three initiatives that were associated with the highest federal budget costs in
the given fiscal year. As most of the initiatives are typically implemented over
a number of years, the consideration was limited to the dollar amount that the
initiative called for in the fiscal year for which the budget was tabled. For
instance, for budget 2008, the ranking of the initiatives was done based on the
dollar amounts the initiatives represented in 2008-09 fiscal year. As seen from
Table  1,  the  price  tag  associated  with  budget  initiatives  seldom  exceeded 
$1 billion. When it did (for instance, the GST cut in Budget 2006), those 
initiatives were of a broad based nature aiming at improving conditions for a
large proportion of the Canadian population.
As such, business-as-usual measures may be broadly defined as revenue or
spending budget initiatives primarily focused on tax reduction, investing in
health, education, social and national security, and aiming to advance science,
technology and cleaner environment. Previously cited, these initiatives seldom
exceed a cost of $1 billion in a given fiscal year.
The analysis of documents related to Budget 2009 and documents that contain
descriptions  of  the  stimulus  measures  introduced  during  2007  and  2008
2
allows us to identify a number of stimulus measures that do not fully fit into
the notion of business-as-usual measures due to their area of influence and/or
the price associated with them. Figure 3 presents the list of these measures
branding  them  as  “extraordinary”  for  the  purpose  of  this  paper  whereas
Appendix A contains a brief description of the measures. 
It should be noted that the identification and subsequent analysis of extraordinary
measures are flawed with certain subjectivity, as any qualitative analysis
would  be.  However,  in  the  absence  of  a  more  precise  tool  of  analysis, 
extraordinary measures are examined across a number of criteria deemed to 
be  essential  for  assuring  that  fairness  and  effectiveness  are  safeguarded 
when stimulating market economy in a time of economic crisis using public
resources. More specifically, the following several features of government
action are deemed to be essential for assuring higher levels of transparency
and accountability:
•  Broad based approach - the access to the measure is available to as many
economic agents as possible. 
•  Merit based approach - funds are allocated through a competitive process
on or under condition of meeting certain standards. 
Extraordinary measures
are examined across 
a number of criteria
deemed to be essential
for assuring that fairness
and effectiveness are
safeguarded
2  Department of Finance Canada (2008). Backgrounder – Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility,
Department of Finance Canada (2008). Economic and Fiscal Statement – Protecting Canada’s Future,
Department of Finance Canada (2008). The Budget Plan, Department of Finance Canada (2008).
Backgrounder – Support for Canadian Credit Markets.23
Table 1 – Three Federal Budget Initiatives with the Highest Price Tag in
Each Fiscal Year, 1999-2008 (Millions of Dollars)
2008-09
First Nations water and wastewater action plan
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority
Strengthening First Nations and Inuit health
2007-08
New $2,000 child tax credit
Income stabilization for farmers - direct costs
Working income tax benefit
2006-07
Reducing GST rate to 6%
Reducing the bottom personal income tax rate
Universal child care benefits
2005-06








Sustainable Development Technology Canada
Indirect cost of research
National child benefit supplement
2002-03
New approach to air security




Equiping and deploying more intelligence
Indirect research costs
2000-01
Canada Child Tax Benefit
Assisting the homeless
Sustainable Development Technology Fund
1999-00
Youth Employment Strategy renewal
Canada Jobs Fund


































































Note: Equalization payments are excluded from the analysis.
Source: Based on information presented in Budget Plans for corresponding years. 
CGA-Canada analysis.24
•  Share based approach - only a portion of the total funds is provided to each
economic agent. 
•  Disclosure of possible fiscal impacts – information on the possible impact
of the government measure on the budgetary balance is available to the
public. 
•  Presence of parliamentary approval – the Parliament is able to influence the
allocation of funds.
As seen from Figure 3, extraordinary measures related to tax relief and 
infrastructure improvements score well based on these criteria. The main
shortcoming of the most credit easing measures however relates to the fact that
their possible negative impact is not reflected in the budgetary forecasts, nor
is the Parliament given an opportunity to debate and influence the specifics of
these measures. It should be noted, that the lack of budget visibility for such
measures as credit easing is well within the framework of the current legislative
requirements. However, it may seem appropriate to assume greater disclosure
of the possible fiscal implications of such measures given the extraordinary
dollar amount associated with them. As for the loans to the auto industry, they
are assigned the lowest score due to their inability to meet any of the identified
criteria while bearing a significant price tag. 
Loans to the auto 
industry are assigned
the lowest score due to
their inability to meet
any of the identified 
criteria while bearing 
a significant price tag
Figure 3 – Assessing the Quality of Extraordinary Stimulus Measures
Insured Mortgage Purchase Program 125.0 ++ Low -- -- Average
Business Credit Availability Program 13.0 ++ Low -- + Average
Canadian Secured Credit Facility 12.0 ++ Low -- -- Average
New 10-year Canada Mortgage Bond 10.0 + n/a Low -- -- Average
Loans to Auto Industry 9.7 -- --* High -- -- Poor
Home Renovation Tax Credit 3.0 + n/a Low ++ Good
Infrastructure Stimulus Fund 2.0 ++ Low ++ Good
Personal Income Tax Relief for all Taxpayers 1.9 + n/a Low ++ Good
Loans to Municipalities (under actions  
to stimulate housing constructions) 1.0 ++ Low -- -- Average
Improving Infrastructure at 
Universities and Colleges 1.0 ++ Low ++ Good
*   For the loans to the auto industry, the submission of restructuring plans as a pre-condition for issuing
loans was not considered as a merit based allocation of funds because of the lack of detailed specifications
that were supposed to be met by the restructuring plans. 
Source: Department of Finance Canada (2009). The Budget Plan, Department of Finance Canada (2009).























The exceptional nature of the extraordinary measures presents us with some
caveat – their effectiveness and their possible ‘side effects’ are not known or
not clearly understood.
Understanding of benefits achieved versus costs incurred as a result of a 
government initiative is valuable for any policy measures; particularly those
involving public funds. Using a with-and-without approach, which relies on
comparing benefits of the measure to the situation that would have been in the
absence of the measure, could be an appropriate tool. However, given the
global scale of the economic downturn, the sudden nature of its development
and the high level of uncertainty in behavioural patterns of economic agents,
there is little hope that a with-and-without approach could ever be applied to
the extraordinary stimulus measures. 
In the absence of precise tools for assessing the quality of the measures, the
use of a rather normative notion of “rightness” may be an appropriate approach.
However, that is an exceedingly complex task as “rightness” is challenging 
to define in a way that takes into account the interests of all members of 
society. Recognizing these challenges, further consideration is focused on the
extraordinary  measure  that  received  the  lowest  quality  score  as  presented 
in Figure 3. Given the low quality of the measure, the analysis is directed at
identifying concerns associated with the measure which, in turn, may also
inform our opinion on the “rightness” of undertaking it. 
The main ‘side effect’ of the extraordinary measures lies in their possible
impact on the federal budget balance and the eventual federal debt. As most of
the largest extraordinary measures are not incorporated into the budget as 
budgetary components, Section 4 discusses the concerns that may arise regarding
the federal public debt.
The main ‘side effect’ 
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The classical assumption of a market economy is that the role of government
is to improve the functioning of the economy by providing public goods (i.e.
those that can be jointly consumed by many consumers and that are subject to
extensive free-rider problems), mitigating externalities (i.e. consequences of
an economic activity that are experienced by unrelated third parties), establishing
and protecting property rights, and providing regulations that assure fair 
functioning of the economy.
The modern economy though, is relatively more complex and governments are
now widely received not only as rule-setters but also as important economic
agents  that  shape  industrial  policies  and  competitiveness  by  regulation.  If
needed, government is apparently expected to participate actively in the market.
As the recent global economic downturn showed, governments are increasingly
encouraged, and expected, to become a vital part of the solution in times of
elevated economic uncertainty.
The unprecedented scope of recent market intervention is often linked to the
global nature of the crisis and the overall increased globalisation of the world
economy. However, bailouts are not a new phenomenon to the world. Since
1970, the U.S. which is often seen as one of the prevalent market oriented
economies has bailed out the private sector on 15 occasions.
3 However, these
bailouts have primarily (but not exclusively) been focused on the banking and
financial industry due to the strong and disruptive feedback mechanism existing
between financial sector failure and the ability of the real sector of the economy
to continue functioning. 
Unlike the financial sector, the feedback mechanism of a non-financial industry
is often smaller due to more focused interlinks of the non-financial industry
with the rest of the economy. The recent massive intervention of the Canadian
government in the operations of the auto industry shifted dramatically the 
balance between the state and the market; at least in an area other than financial
sector. The act itself of bailing out and the sheer magnitude of the intervention,
bring certain concerns regarding the rightness of such actions.  
Concerns Associated with the
Government Bailout of the 
Auto Industry 3
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3  Based on ProPublica (2009). History of U.S. Gov’t Bailouts, available at http://www.propublica.org/special/
government-bailouts accessed October 17, 2009.28
3.1. Structure of the Bailout
The financial assistance package provided by the federal government to the
Canadian auto industry consisted of three distinct elements: (i) Interim loans
for selected automakers, (ii) a Canadian Warranty Commitment Program, and
(iii) Expansion of the Account Receivable Insurance Program.
The interim loans for the auto industry were provided by the federal government
in partnership with the government of Ontario and were announced in three
steps:
1.  On December 20, 2008, the governments announced the provision of up
to $4 billion ($2.7 from the federal and $1.3 billion from the Ontario
government) payable to General Motors of Canada Limited (GM of
Canada) and Chrysler Canada Inc. (Chrysler Canada). GM of Canada
was eligible for loans of up to $3 billion, whereas Chrysler Canada was
eligible for loans of up to $1 billion. The loans were provided for general
business purpose on a 91 day term renewable, up to a maximum of three
years, basis. Loan renewal was conditional on submission of acceptable
restructuring  plans  that  include  specific  actions  sufficient  to  ensure
long-term  viability  of  the  borrower’s  business  operations.
4 Although
available, the loans were not taken up by either GM of Canada or Chrysler
Canada.  Instead,  the  two  companies  (in  conjunction  with  their  U.S. 
parent companies) opted to submit independently business restructuring
plans that also included a request for larger financial assistance from
both the U.S. and Canadian governments.
5
2.  On April 30, 2009, the governments extended a short-term working capital
loan ($209 million), a medium-term restructuring loan ($1.116 billion),
and renewed the existing interim loan ($1 billion) to Chrysler Canada.
It also joined the U.S. government in providing debtor-in-possession
loans to Chrysler LLC (the U.S. parent company) and contributed $1.45
billion to that purpose. The overall joint package of loans in support of
the further restructuring amounted to $3.775 billion.
6 In exchange for
this support, the governments of Canada and Ontario received a combined
2.46% share in a restructured Chrysler LLC and obtained the right to
appoint  one  independent  director  (out  of  nine)  to  the  board  of  the
restructured company. The U.S. government holds 9.85% of the new
Chrysler whereas 20% belongs to Fiat and 67.69% to the United Auto
Workers’ retiree healthcare trust fund.
7
The financial assistance
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4  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). Backgrounder – Government Support to the Auto Industry,
December 20, 2008.
5  House of Commons Canada (2009). A Study of the Crisis in the Automotive Sector in Canada, Report of
the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, p. 16. 
6  Office of the Prime Minister (2009). Canada and Ontario: Joint Support for Chrysler Restructuring, 
Backgrounder, April 30, 2009.
7  Ramsey, M. and Forden, S.G. (2009). Fiat Forms Sixth-Largest Carmaker on Chrysler Assets,
Bloomberg.com, June 10, 2009.29
3.  On June 1, 2009, the governments provided U.S. $9.1 billion in new
short-term funding, most of which was for GM of Canada, whereas up to
U.S. $3.2 billion was for a joint Canada-U.S. debtor-in-possession loan to
General Motors Corporation (the U.S. parent company of GM of Canada).
A month prior, the governments of Canada and Ontario approved a U.S.
$413 million working capital loan to GM of Canada as part of an interim
loan announced on December 20, 2008. The overall joint package of
loans in support of further GM of Canada’s restructuring amounted to
U.S. $9.5 billion (C$10.6 billion
8). At the conclusion of the court-supervised
process, all of this funding is to be transformed into a loan of up to U.S.
$1.3 billion for GM of Canada, U.S. $403 million of preferred shares in
General Motors Corporation, an 11.7% ownership stake in General Motors
Corporation and the right to appoint an independent director to the board
of  the  newly  restructured  company.
9 The  U.S.  government  received
60.8% of the common equity of the new GM, the United Autoworkers
Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association – 17.5%, whereas bond-
holders of Motor Liquidation Company (former GM) received a 10%
stake with the possibility of increasing their share to 25%.
10
Summing up the three steps presented above, the governments of Canada
and Ontario committed some $14.6 billion
11 in interim loans to the two
automakers  with  the  respective  split  of  $9.7  billion  and  $4.9  billion
between the federal and Ontario governments. Of the total $14.6 billion
amount, 31.8% was provided to the U.S. parent companies of the two
automakers, while the remaining 68.2% was provided to GM of Canada
and Chrysler Canada. Repayments of loans provided to Chrysler is scheduled
to be completed by 2017, whereas loans provided to General Motors will
be repaid by 2015.
12
The Canadian Warranty Commitment Program was launched on April 7, 2009
to ensure that consumer warranties are honoured on new vehicles purchased
from GM of Canada and Chrysler Canada. Under the program, a separate entity
was to be funded by a loan from the federal government and cash contributed
by the automakers to pay for repairs covered by the automaker’s warranty on
each new vehicle sold during companies’ restructuring period. The cash 
contributions  from  the  government  (110%)  and  automakers  (15%)  would
amount to 125% of the costs projected by the automakers to satisfy anticipated
claims under the warranty issued on a particular vehicle. The program was to
The governments of
Canada and Ontario 
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8  Government of Canada (2009). Canada’s Economic Action Plan – A Second Report to Canadians,
p. 60.
9  Office of the Prime Minister (2009). Backgrounder - Canada and Ontario: Joint Support for General 
Motors Restructuring, June 1, 2009.
10  Isidore, C. (2009). “New” GM Is Born, CNNMoney.com, July 10, 2009.
11  The dollar amounts of the financial support presented in this section may not add to the total of 
$14.6 billion. See Section 3.2.5 for details.
12 Government of Canada (2009). Public Accounts of Canada 2009, Prepared by the Receiver General for
Canada, p. 2.33.30
cover a 12 month period and assume that in the event of a failure of GM of
Canada or Chrysler Canada to honour their consumer warranties, the trust
administrator from the separate entity would appoint an auto service provider
to supply the warranty services using funds from the Program.
13 Although 
government documents did not contain a specific dollar amount assigned to the
program, the coverage of the announcement in the media frequently refers to a
$185.3 million price tag. On September 16, 2009, the program was announced
to be brought to a close as consumer confidence in the warranty commitments
was restored after both companies emerged from bankruptcy protection.
Another announcement made on April 7, 2009, related to the expansion by
way of an additional $700 million, of the Accounts Receivable Insurance
Program for auto parts manufacturers. The program is administered by Export
Development Corporation (EDC) and covers Canadian companies for up to
90% of losses caused by non-payment from their customers. In the specific
case of the Canada’s auto industry, the expansion of the program is used to 
protect the auto parts suppliers selling to the auto manufacturers, such as GM
of Canada and Chrysler Canada. This extension brought the EDC’s overall
exposure for auto parts suppliers to $1.25 billion.
14
Canada’s  bailout  of  the  auto  industry  was,  largely,  a  replication  of  the 
measures taken by the U.S. government. The U.S. government initiated three
distinct programs to support the automotive industry: the Automotive Industry
Financing Program to assist automakers and their financing arms, the Auto
Warranty Commitment Program to support consumer confidence in these
companies, and the Auto Supplier Support Program to assist the firms that
supply them. 
As  of  September  30,  2009,  the  Automotive  Industry  Financing  Program 
committed financial assistance of U.S. $12.5 billion to Chrysler LLC, U.S.
$49.5 billion to General Motors Corporation, U.S. $1.5 billion to Chrysler
Financial, and U.S. $13.4 billion to GMAC Financial Services. The Auto
Warranty  Commitment  Program  allocated  U.S.  $641  million  to  cover  all 
warranties on new vehicles purchased during the Chrysler LLC and General
Motors Corporation’s restructuring periods. As both automakers were able to
honour their warranties during the restructuring periods, these funds were
repaid  and  the  Warranty  Program  terminated  as  of  July  2009.  The  Auto
Supplier  Support  Program  provides  select  suppliers  with  access  to
Government-backed protection that guarantees the receivables are paid for
parts supplied to Chrysler LLC and General Motors Corporation and allocates
up to U.S. $3.5 billion to this purpose.
15
13  Industry Canada (2009). Canadian Warranty Commitment Program, Backgrounder, April 7, 2009.
14  Industry Canada (2009). Accounts Receivable Insurance Program, Backgrounder, April 7, 2009.
15  Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relieved Program (2009). Quarterly 
Report to Congress, October 2009, p. 89-93.
Canada’s bailout of 
the auto industry was,
largely, a replication of
the measures taken by
the U.S. government31
As financial support to the auto industry unfolded over the 7-month period
(December  2008  to  June  2009),  the  rational  for  actions  of  Canada’s  and
Ontario’s  governments  was  also  changing.  When  the  bailout  was  first
announced  in  December  2008,  the  quoted  rational  for  the  government’s 
intervention was to fulfill government’s commitment “to supporting the auto
industry”.
16 The latter was part of the broader commitment announced in the
Throne Speech opening the second session of the 40th Parliament of Canada.
The speech indicated that the economic stimulus plan will see the federal 
government acting “to support Canadian industries in difficulty – including
forestry, manufacturing, automotive, tourism, agriculture [...].”
17 It was also
suggested that the bailout would “protect the Canadian Economy” and ensure
that “Canada maintains our current production share of the North American
market.”
18
In  its  June  announcement  regarding  the  further  extension  of  the  interim
financing to GM of Canada, the federal government linked the rational of 
their actions to the course of actions undertaken by the U.S. government as the
auto industries in Canada and the U.S. are tightly linked. Specifically, the
Prime  Minister’s  speech  suggested  that  when  “the  Bush  administration
announced that it would be putting together a rescue package for troubled
North American automakers”, that decision required Canadian government to
act.
19 Finally,  in  the  second  and  consecutive  progress  reports  on  Canada’s
Economic Action Plan, the government emphasized that the additional support
to the automotive industry was to preserve and to protect jobs.
20
As the role of the federal government was noticeably more prominent in terms
of the size of funds allocated to the auto industry and influence exercised, the
balance of this paper primarily revolves around the issues as they relate to the
federal government. 
3.2. Main Concerns
The consideration of the rational used by the government to bailout the auto
industry may lead to a number of conclusions. First, that the auto industry is
just one of a number of other industries supported by the government, but its
size  is  critical  to  the  economy.  Second,  that  the  bailout  will  ensure  that
Canada’s current share of the North American auto industry is preserved. And
third,  that  government  action  did  preserve  jobs.  The  subsequent  sections 
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16  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). Backgrounder – Government Support to the Auto Industry,
December 20, 2008.
17  Governor General (2008). Speech from the Throne to Open the Fortieth Parliament of Canada, p. 3.
18  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). PM and Premier McGuinty Announce Financial Support for the 
Auto Industry, Media Release, December 20, 2008.
19  Office of the Prime Minister (2009). PM Announces Support for General Motors, Speech, 
June 1, 2009.
20  Government of Canada (2009). Canada’s Economic Action Plan – A Second Report to Canadians,
p. 11 and p. 60; Government of Canada (2009). Canada’s Economic Action Plan – A Third Report to
Canadians, p. 118.32
discuss the validity of these assumptions in greater length. The analysis is also
supplemented by the consideration of concerns associated with ‘picking the
winner’ approach and a probing of the motivation of the federal government.
For the purpose of this paper, the auto industry is understood as comprising of
three industry groups: (i) motor vehicle manufacturing which is primarily
engaged  in  manufacturing  chassis  and  then  assembling  complete  motor 
vehicles; (ii) motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing which is primarily
engaged in manufacturing motor vehicles bodies and cabs, truck trailers and
non-commercial trailers; and (iii) motor vehicle parts manufacturing which
manufactures and rebuild motor vehicle parts including engines, electrical and
electronic equipment, transmission and power train parts, etc.
21 The industries
that represent the further extension of the auto industry into services (e.g.
motor vehicle and parts wholesalers and dealers, automotive equipment rental
and leasing, sales financing, automobile insurance and vehicle servicing) are
believed to be less sensitive to the changes in the production capacity of the
auto industry. As these service industries primarily serve consumers rather
than producers, they are deemed to be less affected by the shifts of the market
allocations between different brands of vehicles. As such, the service industries
have not been included in our analysis.
3.2.1. Is the Bailout to the Auto Industry 
Proportional to Its Size?
The provisions of financing to the auto industry was part of a broader set of 
measures  incorporated in  Budget  2009  and  intended  to  enhance  sectoral 
competitiveness  and  provide  a  short-term  support  for  key  sectors  facing
unprecedented challenges due to declining global demand.
22  Among the industries
identified as key economic sectors (other than the auto industry) were forestry,
agriculture, shipbuilding and the space industry. 
The measures to be implemented in these key sectors in the 2009-10 fiscal
year included $70 million to improve marketing and innovation in the forestry
sector, $85 million to increase agricultural flexibility through implementing
non-business  risk-management  measures  and  enhancing  slaughterhouse
capacity, $19 million to speed up procurement in the shipbuilding industry,
and $20 million to further develop robotics and technologies in the space
industry.
23 Although not incorporated in Budget 2009, the second progress
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21  The North American Industry Classification System identifies these industry groups as Motor Vehicle
Manufacturing (NAICS 3361), Motor Vehicle Body and Trailer Manufacturing (NAICS 3362), and Motor
Vehicle Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 3363).
22  Department of Finance Canada (2009). Canada’s Economic Action Plan – Budget 2009, p. 169.
23  Department of Finance Canada (2009). The Budget Plan, p. 170-174 and Table 3.8.33
report on Canada’s Economic Action Plan indicated that $70 million was
allocated to extend the mineral exploration tax credit.
24 
Despite the fairly diverse sectoral support described above, a certain imbalance
may be noticed in the scale of the supportive measures provided to the auto
industry  and  to  other  key  sectors  of  the  economy.  Specifically,  while  the 
federal funding to the auto industry amounted to $9.7 billion, other key sectors
combined received $0.264 billion. A noticeable difference in the scale and
magnitude of the government support to different industries may lead to a 
conclusion that the auto industry stands out significantly compared to other
industries when it comes to the industry’s economic importance. 
Along  with  the  steel,  chemicals  and  electronics  industries,  Canada’s  auto
industry is often referred to as a jewel of Canadian manufacturing with strong
export capabilities and technological base. Although these merits are well 
recognized, the relative perspective of the industry size may bring an additional
dimension to the discussion of government intervention. 
In  2007,
25 the  auto  industry  constituted  one  of  the  largest  manufacturing 
industries and accounted for 13.5% of the total manufacturing. However, the
manufacturing sector itself was (and is) only a fraction of the total Canadian
economy which now relies heavily on service-producing industries and natural
resource extraction. When the consideration is expanded from manufacturing
to all industries, it becomes apparent that the contribution of the auto industry
to the total GDP is merely 2.1% with some 18 other industries contributing
more to GDP than the auto industry (Figure 4). Contribution of the auto industry
to total GDP was also somewhat less than the combined participation of the
other  key  sectors  of  the  economy  which  received  government  support  in
Budget  2009.  Forestry,  agriculture,  shipbuilding  and  the  space  industries
together made up 2.6% of total industry GDP in 2007.
26 It should be mentioned
that the auto industry is almost entirely concentrated in the province of Ontario
(in 2007, Ontario produced 93.6% of the Canadian auto industry’s output). But
even though, the auto industry remains a relatively small part (4.7%) of Ontario’s
well diversified economy. 
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24  Department of Finance Canada (2009). Canada’s Economic Action Plan – A Second Report to 
Canadians, p. 161 and Table 2.12.
25  The year 2007 may be considered as the most recent year prior to the financial crisis and economic
downturn which affected the structure of the Canadian economy. As such, 2007 was chosen as the 
reference year for the analysis of the economic importance of the auto industry.
26  The combined contribution of forestry, agriculture, shipbuilding and the space industries is understood 
as a sum of GDPs produced by Crop and Animal Production (NAICS 11), Forestry and Logging 
(NAICS 113), Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 3364), and Ship and Boat Building
(NAICS 3366).34
One of the strong features of the auto industry is its high (and increasing) 
level of labour productivity which exceeds several times the average labour
productivity of the Canadian economy. Although a positive element in itself,
high labour productivity also implies that the reliance of the auto industry on
labour input is lower than in many other industries. Not surprising then, that
the auto industry employment accounted for only 1.0% of all employed in
Canada in October 2007 – the month that featured the lowest unemployment
rate in the past three decades. In turn, the other key sectors supported by
Budget 2009 employed some 3.2% of all employed in that month.
27
Many industries have contracted as the financial crisis and the impacts of the
economic downturn spread into the real economy over 2008 and 2009. Auto
industry output has undoubtedly seen one of the deepest drops, while a whole
range of other industries have experienced noticeable decline as well. For
instance,  output  of  such  industries  as  paper  manufacturing,  wood  product
manufacturing,  plastic  and  rubber  manufacturing,  primary  and  fabricated
metal products manufacturing, forestry and logging and supportive activities
The auto industry
employment accounted
for only 1.0% of all
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Figure 4 – Industries Contributing More to the Total Industry 
GDP Than the Auto Industry, 2007
Note: To allow for a meaningful comparison, the contribution of the auto industry was contrasted with contributions 
of the Canadian industries coded with 3-digit code of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
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27  Based on CANSIM Table 281-0023.35
for mining declined by 20% or more between January 2008 and April 2009.
Combined, these industries represented 5.8% of industry GDP in 2007 employing
some 4.8% of working Canadians.
28
Although the volume of output and the size of employment are two important
parameters of any industry, they do not directly reflect the economic impact
that may be generated due to expansion, contraction and closure of firms in
that industry. To measure these types of effects, economists use the concept of
multipliers which reflect the direct and indirect impacts of the industry’s activity
on the overall economy. Direct effects consist of impacts of expanding or 
contracting production on the industry itself whereas indirect effects result
from backwards linkages in the economy when firms that reduce their production
also decrease the commodity purchase of inputs from other firms. 
Two main types of multipliers exist – output (or revenue) multipliers and GDP
multipliers. Output multipliers measure how industries use each other’s output
and show the inter-connections between industries at a micro-level. These
multipliers reflect the industrial structure and the level of integration among
the industries rather than industries productivity and importance. In turn, GDP
multipliers measure the real contribution of the industry to total GDP and
reflect the change in overall production in Canada from a change in production
in a particular industry. GDP multipliers are usually considerably smaller than
output multipliers as they net out the purchases made by industries from 
each other.
29
Some industries with highly developed value chains may increase their output
multipliers by decomposing the production rather than by adding substantial
value to the national output. Manufacturing may be a good example. The
analysis conducted by Statistics Canada shows that manufacturing has the 4th
highest output multiplier among the 22 major sectors of the Canadian economy,
whereas in terms of the GDP multiplier, manufacturing had the lowest multiplier
in 2002.
30 This is why, it may be important to focus the consideration on the
industry’s contribution to the national prosperity (i.e. GDP) as opposed to the
scope of its interdependency with, and level of outsourcing to, other industries.
The situation with the auto industry is somewhat similar to that of overall
manufacturing. As seen from Table 2, output multipliers of the industries that
constitute the auto industry are somewhere in the mid range compared to all
other industries. However, the impact that the changes in the auto industry
production may bring to GDP and employment are among the lowest. For
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28  Based on CANSIM Tables 379-0027 and 281-0023.
29  Cross, P. and Ghanem, Z. (2006). Multipliers and Outsourcing: How Industries Interact with 
Each Other and Affect GDP, Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer, January 2006, p. 3.2.
30  Cross, P. and Ghanem, Z. (2006). Multipliers and Outsourcing: How Industries Interact with 
Each Other and Affect GDP, Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic Observer, January 2006, Table 5.36
instance, a $1 change in output production in some 108 Canadian industries
would be associated with a greater impact on Canada’s GDP than a similar
change in production of motor vehicle manufacturing. 
The relatively low GDP multipliers of the auto industry are partially caused by
strong import leakages associated with the industry which satisfies the large
part of its supply requirements through international imports. For instance, to
produce each additional dollar of output, motor vehicle manufacturers directly
or indirectly import 61 cents of inputs reducing significantly their impact on
Canada’s GDP. At the same time, the high capital intensity of the manufacturing
process and relatively low reliance on labour input lessen the auto industry’s
impact on overall employment should a change in production occur. As a
result, the auto industries’ job effects per one million dollars of output (the job
multiplier) are among the lowest across the Canadian industries.
When considering the size of the financial support to the auto industry, it may
also be worth mentioning that the lion’s share of government support to the
auto industry was allocated to two automakers – GM of Canada and Chrysler
Canada – which constitute only part (although a large one) of all auto assemblers
present in Canada. Overall, six companies currently build vehicles in Canada
– General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, Toyota, Suzuki, and Honda.
Table 2 – Auto Industry Economic Multipliers, 2005
Motor vehicle manufacturing
Motor vehicle body and trail-
er manufacturing
Motor vehicle parts 
manufacturing
Note: The multipliers are ranked from the largest to the smallest across 117 industries codified by the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) at 4-digit level.
Source: Statistics Canada (2008). 2005 National and Provincial Multipliers, Catalogue no.
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3.2.2. Will Canada Preserve Its Share of 
North America’s Auto Industry?
Some experts suggest that output and employment in the Canadian auto industry
will fall by at least a third compared to the production peak registered in 1999.
31
A number of factors may suggest that such a trend (if not the actual slope of
the decline) is quite likely to materialize. 
In past decades, the auto industry has developed a strong tendency to produce
in the near proximity to the markets it serves. For the assemblers, the main 
reason continues to be the transportation costs – motor vehicles and many of
their main parts, such as engines and body panels are large, heavy and some-
what delicate, raising transportation costs. For parts suppliers, the main reason
lies in the “lean” production techniques and just-in-time parts delivery that
requires parts production to be located close to the final assembly. 
At  the  same  time,  the  North American  market  (particularly  the  U.S.  and
Canada) are seen to be nearly saturated in terms of vehicle ownership and are
believed to be close to reaching the maximum level of vehicle ownership per
each 1,000 of population. The fairly slow population growth and high level of
income observed in the past three decades resulted in a situation where the
nature of vehicle sales is primarily motivated by replacement of existing vehicles,
rather than selling to first time vehicle owners. For instance, the annual numbers
of passenger car registrations has been declining in the U.S. since the late
1980s (top graph of Figure 5). 
The tendency to locate near the final market and the slow (or no) growth in 
the North America’s vehicle demand led to a shrinking share of the world
vehicle  production  that  takes  place  in  the  North  America.  For  instance, 
North America’s vehicle production declined at an average annual rate of
3.4% dropping from 17.6 million of units produced in 1999 to just 13 million
in  2008.  Contrary  to  the  North American  trend,  other  regions  have  been 
gaining production share. For instance, in China, vehicle production increased
fivefold within the same time frame (bottom graph of Figure 5). 
31  Dennis DesRosiers as referred to in The Economist (2009). The Humbling of Detroit North, July 30, 2009.
The share of the world
vehicle production 
that takes place in 
the North America 
is shrinking38
Figure 5 – Selected Vehicle Statistics
Note: Top graph: Passenger car registrations are recognized as the number of new passenger cars 
or vehicles registered to the authorities. Bottom graph: Vehicle production is recognized as a sum of car 
production and commercial vehicle production.
Source: Top graph: OECD. Stat portal. Bottom graph: The International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers – Production Statistics (available at http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/, accessed 
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North America China India39
Low  consumer  confidence,  tight  credit  conditions  and  relatively  high 
unemployment rates that have become familiar features of the U.S. economy
over  the  past two years  may  further  suppress  household demand for new 
vehicles in North America. At the same time, the rapidly developing middle
class in the new fast-growing economies such as China and India will most
probably focus the expansion efforts of the auto industry in the regions of 
near proximity to those countries. For instance, vehicle ownership is forecasted
to grow by a mere 1.1% annually in the U.S. between 2002 and 2030 
while expanding by as much 11.1% and 8.1% per year in China and India
respectively.
32 Taken together, these trends strongly suggest that the nominal
volume  of  vehicle  production  taking  place  in  North America  is  likely  to
decline in the years to come. Whether or not Canada will be able to preserve
its current share of a shrinking market is another important question. 
The lion’s share of North America’s vehicle production still takes place in the
U.S.; however, the past decade witnessed a noticeable change in the production
breakdown between the three North American countries – the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico. That is, while vehicle production in Canada and the U.S. has
been  declining  at  an  annual  average  rate  of  4.2%  and  4.4%  respectively
between 1999 and 2008, vehicle production in Mexico saw an accelerated
growth averaging 3.9% annually (Figure 6). This allowed Mexico to double its
share of North American vehicle production in the past decade from 8.8% in
1999 to 16.9% in 2008.
32  Dargay, J. et al (2007). Vehicle Ownership and Income Growth, Worldwide: 1960-2030, University of
Leeds, Table 3.
While vehicle production
in Canada and the U.S.
has been declining,
vehicle production 
in Mexico saw an 
accelerated growth40
The Canadian auto industry has traditionally benefited from two competitive
advantages – the low Canadian dollar vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, and a highly
qualified labour force that can be accessed at lower costs than in some other
regions. However, these advantages have been slowly but steadily eroding
over past and recent years. After a noticeable appreciation of the Canadian
dollar during the 1990s, the exchange rate advantage faded away with the
exchange rate declining from its peak of 1.6 per US$1 in January 2002 to a
thirty-year low of 0.97 per US$1 in November 2007.
33 This noticeable change
increased  significantly  the  relative  cost  of  Canadian-purchased  goods  and 
services such as energy, raw materials and parts. Although since its 2007 
pummelling the U.S. dollar did briefly gain some ground, the consequences of
the current economic downturn appear to be much more severe and profound
in the U.S. – making it less likely for the U.S. dollar to re-gain its stature in
the immediate future. The expected recovery of oil prices may put an additional
upward pressure on the Canadian dollar (for instance, Bank of Canada projects
crude oil price to be at approximately $80 per barrel level over 2010 and
2011
34).
In addition, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar affected the Canadian
labour cost advantage increasing (in relative terms) labour and related benefits
and pension costs. However, the labour cost advantage has also declined in
Figure 6 – Vehicle Production in North America
Source: The International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers – Production Statistics 
























































33  Based on CANSIM Table 176-0064.
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currency-neutral terms. For instance, unit labour cost in manufacturing – an
indicator that reflects the cost competitiveness and represents the share of
labour costs in producing one unit of output – has historically been much higher
in Canada than in Mexico. However, recent years reveal a fast narrowing of
the gap between U.S. and Canada unit labour cost which may further diminish
the attractiveness of Canada for location of the U.S. operations (Figure 7). 
The saturation and distribution of North America’s auto market described
above leads to a situation where the shifts in vehicle production and employment
within  North America  essentially  represent  a  “zero-sum  game”  –  with
some places gaining in production capacity at the expense of others losing.
35 At
the same time, the diminishing competitive advantages of the Canadian auto
industry and the strong political will of the U.S. government to maintain the
presence of the auto industry in the U.S. may create strong preconditions for
the Canadian auto industry to continue losing its share of vehicle production
in North America.
The signs that the auto industry (and particularly U.S. automakers) slowly but
steadily withdraws from Canada have been fairly obvious in the past several
years. For instance, since the beginning of 2006, General Motors Corporation
has made four announcements indicating closures of Canadian plants or job
cuts that cumulatively affect some 6,170 automotive jobs. Chrysler LLC and
Ford have each made two announcements of a similar nature planning to cut
some 7,200 jobs.
36 These changes did not remain unnoticed in the overall
























































































35  Industry Canada (2007). Prospects for Canada in the NAFTA Automotive Industry: A Global Value Chain
Analysis. Available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/gvc-cvm.nsf/eng/h_00024.html, accessed August 25, 2009. 
36  Calculated based on information provided in CBC News (2009). A Timeline of Auto Sector Layoffs,
February 9, 2009. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/10/21/f-autolayoffs.html, accessed
July 31, 2009.
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employment numbers of the Canadian auto industry. For instance, the number
of workers employed by the auto industry declined at an average annual rate
of 4.6% over 2006 and 2007 while in the overall economy employment was
growing  by  2.3%  annually  during  the  same  period.  The  total  decline  of
employment in the auto industry from its peak in May 2001 to January 2008
amounted to 17.6% or some 31,000 employees.
It should be noted that reallocation of resources across sectors and countries,
particularly labour force, is a constant phenomenon in the current age of increased
labour mobility and the global nature of the value chain and competition. For
instance, between 2003 and 2008, the rapid raise in commodity prices and the
sharp appreciation of the Canadian dollar led to a noticeable shift in employment
from manufacturing industries to extracting and so-called non-tradable sectors
(the latter includes construction, finance, insurance and real estate, and the
wholesale and retail trade sectors).
37 
However, the shift of employment in the auto industry is different as it is 
primarily driven by the overcapacity of the industry itself rather than by more
attractive employment opportunities existing elsewhere. For instance, the U.S.
vehicle production forecasted to be around 6-7 million units per year over
2009-2013 leaving ample capacity room compared to the production peak of
13 million in 1999.
38 Similarly, North America’s current annual demand of
about  10-11  million  units  is  considerably  smaller  than  the  current  North
American production capacity of some 16 million units.
39
One more fact seems to be of importance. The adjusted for inflation profitability
of the Canadian motor vehicle and trailer manufacturing (measured as profit
before income tax) declined at an average annual rate of 24.6% between 1999
and 2007 while in other non-financial industries, profit grew by an annual
average of 6.9% within the same period of time. Is it really possible to expect
that the industry demonstrating such financial results will not respond through
restructuring, consolidation, and/or withdrawal?
3.2.3. Did the Governments’ Action Preserve Jobs?
One of the main challenges in assessing the validity of the assumption that
financing of the auto industry preserved jobs is the lack of information of what
would have otherwise happened in the absence of the governments’ financial
support. For instance, an insolvent company has a number of options at its 
disposal: it may pursue a merger with another company, refinance business
37  Dupuis, D. and Marcil, P. (2008). The Effects of Recent Relative Price Movements on the Canadian
Economy. Bank of Canada, Bank of Canada Review, Autumn 2008, p. 46.
38  Rubin, J. (2009). Wrong Turn, CIBC World Markets, StrategEcon, March 2, 2009, p. 6.
39  House of Commons Canada (2009). A Study of the Crisis in the Automotive Sector in Canada, Report of
the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, 40th Parliament, 2nd Session, p. 13.
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loans, negotiate out-of-court arrangement with its creditors, file for bankruptcy,
and, finally, wind down the company. Estimating how many jobs have been
preserved by the government bailout would require a number of assumptions;
particularly regarding the option the particular automaker would have chosen
in the absence of public funds, the willingness of other market participants to
take an active role in that option (e.g. be motivated for a merger or acquisition
of liquidating assets), and the geographical concentration of these actions. 
To mitigate this challenge, attention is focused not so much on whether the
jobs have been saved, but rather on the magnitude of the job losses sustained
by the auto industry and how the outcome compares to the job losses in 
industries that have not been financed by the government. The analysis was
based on industries that employ a comparable or greater number of workers
than does the auto industry.
40 As seen from Table 3, and despite the billions 
of  dollars  injected,  the  auto  industry’s  employment  sustained  the  highest 
contractions on the pan-Canadian scale and in the province of Ontario. This
was  true  in April  2009,  shortly  prior  to  the  government  approving  the 
restructuring plan of Chrysler and General Motors, and in August 2009 when
both Chrysler LLC and General Motors Corporation had already emerged
from bankruptcy protection. 
Table 3 – Top Five Industries That Sustained the Highest 
Job Losses – Selected Months of 2009
Source: CANSIM Table 281-0023, Statistics Canada (2009). Employment, Earnings and Hours,






April 2009 to April 2008
Auto industry -17.6%




August 2009 to August 2008
Auto industry -22.1%
Machinery manufacturing -16.2%
Fabricated metal product manufacturing -15.5%
Truck transportation -10.0%






Administrative and support services -10.4%
Specialty trade contractors -8.0%
Credit intermediation and related -6.6%
Professional, scientific and techn. services -1.4%
Auto industry -22.1%
Credit intermediation and related -10.0%
Administrative and support services -9.7%
Specialty trade contractors -7.8%
Professional, scientific and techn. services -4.1%
40  To allow for a meaningful comparison, the employment was analysed in industries coded with 3-digit
code of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
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Although labour statistics indicate that non-farm payroll employment was on
the rise in July 2009 (the first increase since its peak in October 2008), this
positive trend may not necessarily be the case in the auto industry. The recent
analysis  conducted  by  the  Conference  Board  of  Canada  suggests  that  the
labour force of the Canadian auto parts manufacturing industry may further
fall by one third over 2009 following closely the production trend in this
industry which is projected to fall by 39% in 2009.
41 Car manufacturers also
plan to reduce further the number of employees. For instance, GM of Canada
expects that its hourly wage workforce will decline from 10,300 in 2008 to
4,400 in 2014. Cuts to the salaried staff are also expected and the number of
GM dealerships in Canada will drop from 705 dealers in 2009 to between 395
to 425 dealers at the end of 2010.
42
3.2.4. Is Picking the Winner the Right Approach? 
The support of the auto industry fits well within what the political fabric
would identify as an ‘industrial policy’. Using industrial policy to promote
economic growth or to achieve other social benevolent outcome has been used
extensively by many countries over past decades. 
Although  widely  used,  industrial  policy  remains  a  complex  phenomenon. 
In broad terms, two types of industrial policy may be identified. First is to 
use  government  strategies  to  create  conditions  for  overall  private  sector 
competitiveness and enhance the ability of domestic firms to increase their
productivity to outcompete foreign rivals. Second is to undertake selective
government interventions that attempt to alter the sectoral structure of production
which would have been different in the absence of such interventions. This 
is often referred to as ‘industrial targeting’, or more colloquially – picking 
the winner. While the first type of industrial policy is largely driven by the
desire to achieve competitiveness on global markets, the second is primarily
justified by the presence of market failures (such as imperfect competition and
information asymmetries) which do not allow a competitive market system to
yield the socially efficient outcome. 
As with other areas of public policy, a consensus regarding the efficacy and
benefits of government interventions to increase the overall competitiveness
has not yet been reached.
43 The often listed shortcomings include distraction
from the more important determinants of prosperity; namely domestic 
productivity growth, possible intervention of geopolitical strategies into 
industrial policy, and harsh penalties that may be associated with excessive
41  Conference Board of Canada (2009). Auto Parts Manufacturers Forecast to Cut 36,000 Jobs in 2009,
News Release 10-03.
42  CBC News (2009). GM to Drop Pontiac in 2010, Cut Thousands More Jobs, April 27, 2009. Available at
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/04/27/gm-pontiac-gone.html, accessed August 11, 2009.
43  See, for instance, DeMartino, G. (2000). Global Economy, Global Justice: Theoretical Objections and
Policy Alternatives to Neoliberalism, Chapter 5 - Contesting Competitiveness, New York: Routledge.
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global exposure. However, a picking the winner strategy is associated with an
even greater number of shortcomings. Among those are the uncertainty regarding
policy-makers’ ability to identify the “right” industry for intervention, and 
potentially of suboptimal allocation of productive capacity within the industry. 
Identifying “Right” Industry
Participants in a given industry seldom know all events that have taken place
in their industry and respective markets, and as such do not have the complete,
timely, and perfect information that can eliminate all uncertainty. Information
constraints facing policy-makers pursuing industrial targeting may be even
greater due to the natural distance from the industry. This leads to the question
of government ability to identify the sectors that are most worthy of intervention.
The range of knowledge that policy-makers need to possess to structure a 
successful industrial policy is remarkable. One of the studies identifies 15
dimensions that a policy-maker needs to master in order to be able to make
well  informed  decisions  when  venturing  into  industrial  targeting. Among
those are understanding of which firms and industries generate knowledge
spill-overs, which sectors have a long-term comparative advantage, knowledge
about potential competitiveness of particular firms, the ability of the industry
to benefit from dynamic scale economies (i.e. learning by doing), and generation
of new knowledge.
44
Some researchers refer to industry targeting as an ‘experimentation’ process
through which policy-makers selectively influence firms’ entry and exit decisions
in the targeted industries. In such experimentation, policy-makers have modest
assurance against mistakes of “picking losers” instead of winners. In fact, the
research findings suggest that even “an optimally designed industrial targeting
policy may lead in the long-run to the country’s specialization in industries in
which  it  has  little  comparative  advantage”,  or  even  abandon  industries  in
which it has true comparative advantage.
45
Influencing Allocation of Production Capacity
In addition to the risk of picking the wrong industry for targeted support,
direct support to a single firm (or group of firms) within the industry may
affect the effectiveness of the composition of the industry itself. In the case of
the industry with excessive capacity (such as the North American auto industry),
government incentives may affect the pattern of capacity reduction by altering
the optimal product planning and plant location decisions. Encouraging the
firm to maintain its operations in less favourable locations may, in turn, jeopardize
its long-term competitive prospects.
44  Pack, H. and Saggi, K. (2006). The Case for Industrial Policy: A Critical Survey, The World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper 3839, p. 28-29.
45  Klimenko, M (2004). Industrial Targeting, Experimentation and Long-run Specialization, Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 73, Issue 1, p. 78.
Government incentives
may affect the pattern 
of capacity reduction 
by altering the optimal
product planning and
plant location decisions46
In addition, targeted government intervention may simply shift the job losses
or gains from one firm to another as the government incentives for the firm to
stay do not affect the final demand which ultimately determines the level of
production. Preventing exits of firms that could have prevented their failure by
applying more effective planning regimes and adjusting to changing consumer
preferences also signals implied reward for bad business practice. 
The empirical analysis of industrial policy undertaken to date is not decisively
conclusive on whether or not industrial policy works. The main challenges of
the analysis relate to lack of counter-factual information on what would have
happened in the absence of the government intervention and the complexity of
assumptions that need be employed to construct such a scenario. The diversity
of stages of economic development and types of government interventions
across different countries further increase the difficulty of arriving at a one-fit-
all conclusion. However, a fairly thorough analysis of outcomes of industrial
policy in Japan, Korea and Taiwan did conclude that industries having benefited
from intervention did not experience significantly faster growth in productivity
and capital accumulation. As such, industrial policy methodology was found
to make only minor contributions to the economic growth of Asia.
46
3.2.5. Is There a Case of Eroding 
Accountability and Transparency? 
Budget transparency, which is understood as the full disclosure of all relevant
fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner,
47 is naturally a crucial
element of public finance. Canada is seen as using many of the OECD’s best
practices  for  budget  transparency  and  Canada’s  budgetary  documents  and 
procedures  are  typically  viewed  as  containing  a  relatively  high  level  of
detailed publicly available information.
48At the same time, the transparency of
the federal budgeting process has been criticized on a number of occasions.
For instance, the repetition of much larger than expected federal budget 
surpluses in previous years has led to a perception that the federal government
had not been fully transparent regarding the amount of prudence incorporated
in budget planning.
49 In the case of the auto industry rescue, some concerns
regarding the sufficient budgetary transparency may be identified as well. 
46  Noland, M. and Pack, H. (2005). Industrial Policy in an Era of Globalization: Lessons from Asia,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, e-book, available at http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/
358.html, accessed October 3, 2009.
47  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001). OECD Best Practices for Budget
Transparency, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Volume 1, no. 3.
48  M￼hleisen, M. et al (2005). How do Canadian Budget Forecasts Compare With Those of Other Industrial
Countries, International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper, WP/05/66, p. 4 and 17.
49  Department of Finance Canada (2006). Restoring Fiscal Balance in Canada – Focusing on Priorities,
Budget 2006, p. 15.
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Possible Fiscal Outcomes are Not Fully and Timely Discussed
One of the concerns regarding budget transparency relates to the fact that 
the possible impact of the measure on the budgetary balance was not fully 
discussed in the initial budgetary documents. 
The lion’s share of the financial support to the auto industry was provided 
in the form of loans. According to the Government’s accounting policies, 
government loans are recorded as assets on the balance sheet of the government
whereas an expense is recorded only when loans become impaired or written
down as a result of default. For that reason, the loans committed to the auto
industry in December 2008 were not reflected in projections of expenses and
budgetary balance presented in the five-year fiscal outlook incorporated into
the budget. At the same time, there is conjecture that the high likelihood of the
rescue funding becoming an expense rather than an asset was known to the
government at the time of the first announcement in December 2008 (i.e. prior
to tabling Budget 2009).
The interim loans to the auto industry were provided through the Canada
Account managed by Export Development Canada (EDC).
50 Canada Account
is typically used to support export transactions which EDC is unable to support,
i.e. when the risk of the transaction and default exceeds EDC’s normal operational
thresholds applied to commercial lending. The risks for transactions undertaken
through Canada Account are assumed by the federal government.
51 Logic may
suggest that providing the rescue financing through an account that assumes
less-than commercial basis of the transaction is highly likely to be an expense,
in fiscal terms, rather than an asset on the balance sheet of the federal government.
The Prime Minister himself was of a similar opinion when announcing the
support in December 2008. As quoted by the New York Times, the Prime
Minister suggested that “there is obviously money at risk here and there may
well be more money at risk going forward”.
52 However, it was not before June
2009 (5 months after tabling the budget), that the auto loans were taken into
accounts in the projections of the federal budget deficit.
Moreover, the mere fact that the loans equating to 2.4%
53 of direct program
spending for 2009-10 were provided to two private companies in the state of
high financial distress may further emphasize that the risks to the projected
federal fiscal outcomes were not fully discussed and disclosed in the budget
documents.
50  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). Backgrounder - Government Support to the Auto Industry, 
December 20, 2008.
51  Based on information available on EDC website (available at
http://www.edc.ca/english/disclosure_9239.htm, accessed October 6, 2009).
52  As quoted by Austen, I. (2008). Canada Agrees to Its Own Auto Bailout, The New York Times, 
December 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21canada.html,
accessed October 6, 2009.
53  Based on Table 3.8 and Table 4.6 of Department of Finance Canada (2009). The Budget Plan. It should
be noted that by the end of September 2009, the loans to the auto industry were equivalent to 8.1% of 
direct program spending for 2009-10 (compared to 2.4% mentioned above). This change was primarily
caused by the increased amount of loans versus that incorporated in the budget.
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Objectives and Expected Outcomes are Not Clearly Stated 
Another concern regarding potential erosion of budget transparency relates to
the outcome measurements. Support to the auto industry did not stipulate
clearly the expected outcomes of the financial support, nor did it include 
specific indicators to measure the impact and the progress towards achieving
objectives. Moreover, the objectives themselves were scarcely   identified. To
date, the Backgrounder
54 that accompanied the announcement of the bailout
made on December 20, 2008 is probably the most detailed publicly-available
documents in regards to terms and conditions of the assistance package. Yet, 
the rational for the support does not clearly reflect the public interest and the
benefits of the government actions, nor does it identify a specific problem the
support is intended to resolve. Instead, the rational focuses on the fact that
“the Government of Canada is committed to supporting the auto industry”. As
was discussed at the beginning of this section, a similar lack of clarity was also
observed in other documents accompanying the funding announcement where
the rational for the government’s actions was motivated by the necessity to 
follow U.S. actions, to protect the economy, and to save jobs. 
The sufficiency of diligence in formulating terms and conditions attached to
the financial support may also be questioned. For instance, the requirements
associated with the restructuring plans were of a very general character indicating
that renewals of the loans require the submission of “acceptable restructuring
plans” that would ensure long-term viability and restore competitiveness.
55 In
turn, such important financial and economic conditions as repaying loans,
achieving net present value after repayment of the loans, and ability to improve
fuel  efficiency  were  not  specified.  The  conditions  that  accompanied  the
loans committed to automakers once restructuring plans had been approved
were likewise not comprehensive. They primarily focused on limitations on
executive compensations and privileges, limitations on dividend payments,
and oversight conditions missing on the conditions related to, for instance,
jobs and profitability.
Inconsistencies in the Format of Reporting Documents
Increased transparency, particularly in the time of financial crisis and economic
instability, is predominantly important as it diminishes information asymmetry
(perceived  or  actual)  between  the  government  and  the  public,  increases 
government’s credibility, and assures more positive acceptance of the public
measures. In this regard, the publication of documents that present quarterly
progress in the implementation of the Economic Action Plan is commended.
However, the suggested downside of those documents is the inconsistency of
their structure with the budget documents which reduces readers’ ability to
54  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). Backgrounder – Government Support to the Auto Industry, 
December 20, 2008.
55  Office of the Prime Minister (2008). Backgrounder – Government Support to the Auto Industry, 
December 20, 2008.
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easily navigate and track the implementation progress of the specific measures
as well the consistency of the dollar amounts associate with those measures. 
At the time of writing (December 2009), the federal government had released 
5 documents containing information on allocation of government funds in
2009-10. These documents include the Budget itself that lays out Canada’s
Economic Action Plan (tabled in January 2009), and four progress reports 
presenting advances in Plan implementation (tabled respectively in March,
June, September and December of 2009). The most significant inconsistencies
observed in those documents may be summarized as following:
56
•  The measure “Loans to Auto Industry” initially included under the category
“Improved Access to Financing”, was renamed to “Support for the Auto Industry”
and moved to the category of “Support for Industries and Communities”.
•  The category “Action to Help Canadians and Stimulate Spending” was
renamed to “Helping the Unemployed” whereas the subcategory “The
Canada Skills and Transition Strategy” was substituted with “Strengthening
Benefits for Canadian Workers”. 
•  Such measures as “Improving Infrastructure at Colleges and Universities”
and “Canada Foundation for Innovation” were moved from the category of
“Immediate Action to Build Infrastructure – Investments in Knowledge
Infrastructure” to “Creating the Economy of Tomorrow – Action to Invest
in Colleges, Universities and Research”.
•  Such  measures  as  “Transformation  to  a  Green  Energy  Economy”  and
“Canadian Environmental Sustainability Indicators” were moved from the
category “Action to Support Businesses and Communities – A More
Sustainable Environment” to “Creating the Economy of Tomorrow –
Investing in Science and Technology”.
•  The initiative “Public-Private Partnerships” was introduced in Budget 2009,
but was not included in summary tables of the implementation reports.
Inconsistencies may also be noticed in the announcements of the financial
support to the auto industry. For instance, loans provided to Chrysler Canada
were denominated in Canadian dollars whereas loans committed to GM of
Canada were denominated in U.S. dollars with no information provided on the
exchange. Similarly, the only initial announcement dated December 20, 2008
contained a somewhat detailed backgrounder on terms and conditions of the
loans. The April and June announcements of the extended support were not
accompanied by specifications on terms and conditions of loans such as 
closing date, interest rate, security, etc.
57
56  Based on CGA-Canada analysis and information presented in Office of the Parliamentary Budgetary 
Officer (2009). Third Quarterly Update of a Monitoring Framework for Measures Contained in the 
Economic Action Plan.
57  See, for instance, Office of the Prime Minister (2009). Backgrounder - Canada and Ontario: Joint
Support for Chrysler Restructuring, April 30, 2009; Office of the Prime Minister (2009). PM Announces
Support for General Motors, Median Release, June 1, 2009; Office of the Prime Minister (2008).
Backgrounder – Government Support to the Auto Industry, December 20, 2008.50
Summing up the discussion, the following points are deemed important. First,
the governments of Canada and Ontario provided some $14.6 billion in rescue
loans to two automotive companies with nearly one third of the funds allocated
outside of Canada. Second, support to the auto industry does not seem to be
proportional to the size of the industry measured in terms of industry’s output
and  employment;  nor  is  the  support  comparable  to  the  size  of  financial 
support provided to the other key sectors of the Canadian economy. Third, a
number of trends suggest that the North American auto industry will contract
(in nominal terms) in the years to come. Canada’s ability to maintain its share
of  the  shrinking  market  is  highly  uncertain.  Forth,  despite  government 
financial support, the auto industry reported one of the highest (in relative
terms) levels of job losses. As such, the government’s objective to maintain
jobs may not be fully achieved. Fifth, governments and policy makers have a
number of hurdles to conquer in making optimal choices in terms of industrial
support. The empirical research does not find strong supportive evidence for
industrial policy either. And finally, there is contention that the sufficiency of
budgetary transparency can be improved.51
The accounting policies guiding preparation and implementation of the federal
budget stipulate that the value of loans, investments and advances should be
adjusted in the financial statements to approximate their estimated net realizable
value. Prior, loans and investments remained government’s assets unless they
became impaired. As the large number of stimulus measures (particularly
those associated with credit easing) are provided in the form of loans, guarantees
and investments, their potential impact is not currently reflected in the forecasts
of the federal budgetary revenues and expenses. This raises certain concerns
regarding the possible budgetary developments and the degree of awareness.  
4.1. Recessions – When Do They End?
The financial crisis that unfolded over 2007 and 2008 and the global economic
recession provoked by it have often been referred to as the worst, deepest and
most unprecedented recession since the Great Depression. One of the most
dangerous features of this recession has been its synchronous nature among
industrialized and developing countries. And yet, after three consecutive quarters
of a declining real GDP, the recession was "technically" over when Statistics
Canada reported a 0.1% increase in real GDP in the third quarter of 2009. This
contrasted sharply with the projections released in April when a 1% decline in
real GDP was anticipated for the third quarter of 2009.
58
It seems to be beneficial to our current discussion to highlight that the mere
switch from the negative to the positive rate of growth (although a notable
achievement) does not fully reflect the different shades of what can be referred
to as the “end of the recession”. A recession is commonly defined as two 
consecutive quarters of negative growth of real GDP and a simple change to,
for instance, zero growth would already be considered as non-recessionary.
However, such a proclamation of the end of the recession will say nothing
about the time required to reach the pre-recession GDP level or about the level
which the economy could have achieved without the recession (i.e. if the 
pre-recession growth had continued without interruption).
Consideration of the recessions that took place in Canada in the 1980s and the
1990s may provide an interesting illustration of this point. Prior to 2008, the
Concerns Associated with 
Federal Public Debt 4
58  Statistics Canada (2009). Canadian Economic Accounts, The Daily, November 30, 2009 and Bank of
Canada (2009). Monetary Policy Report, April 2009, Table 4. 
The mere switch from
the negative to the 
positive rate of growth
does not fully reflect the
different shades of what
can be referred to as the
“end of the recession”52
most recent recession took place over four quarters between April 1990 and
March 1991, while the one prior to that started in July 1981 and lasted six
quarters until December 1982. Although these recessions were not judged as
very prolonged or deep, it took additional four quarters in the 1980s and ten
quarters in the 1990s for the economy to recover to the pre-recession levels of
real GDP. Altogether, 2.5 years were ‘lost’ in the 1980s and 3.5 years in the
1990s just to restore the level of economy experienced prior to the recessions
(top graph of Figure 8). 
2.5 years were ‘lost’ in
the 1980s and 3.5 years
in the 1990s just to
restore the level of
economy experienced
prior to the recessions
Figure 8 – Past Recessions and Recoveries
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Although in the long-term, the rate of growth of real GDP is seen as paramount
to the creation of national wealth, in the more immediate future, the absolute
levels of real GDP may prove to be critically important as well. In the short-
term, the absolute dollar amount of GDP reflects the level of production (and,
consequentially, employment) in the economy, and influences greatly revenue
flows into government budgets. The proper understanding of this connection
may prove to be crucial for the consideration of the mid-term impact of the
recession on the federal budgetary components.
It should be noted, though, that achieving the pre-recession levels of real GDP
does not, by itself, restore the pre-recession levels of living standards which
are typically measured as GDP per capita. As Canada’s population continued
to grow during the recession and the ‘lost’ years as well, it took some 3 years
in the 1980s and 4.25 years in the 1990s to reach the level of living standards
enjoyed prior to the recessions. 
Another approach to understanding the magnitude of the foregone output due
to the recession is to assume that the economy would have continued growing
if the recession had not taken place. For instance, what would be the level of
real GDP if the economy, instead of sinking into recession, would have grown
at the rate observed in the previous 12 months? The bottom graph of Figure 8
intends to provide a simplified depiction of that scenario. These estimates
should not by any means be considered as a methodologically robust exercise;
however, they nevertheless illustrate well the fact that it takes many years to
achieve the level of living standard (measured as GDP per capita) foregone by
virtue of recession.
Canada’s recovery from the current (2008-2009) recession may further be
aggravated by a number of factors. Canada is a small open economy and its
economic growth depends greatly on export. In light of the global nature of
the economic slowdown, the reliance on export to boost Canada’s economy is
diminished and the weak outlook for the U.S. short- to medium-term economic
prospects does not bode particularly well. Household consumption, which has
been a driving force of Canada’s economic growth for decades, may some-
what be suppressed in the next several years as households may have tendency
to increase their savings due to precautionary and retirement motives. The two
important policy tools that are typically used to promote economic growth –
fiscal policy and lending interest rates – have excessively been used to stop the
spread of the financial crisis – and little room exists for further reliance on
these instruments. Moreover, unprecedented simultaneous stimulus packages
have been injected into economies around the world. The withdrawal (or phasing
out) of the stimulus measures, although a necessary step, may have a somewhat
procyclical impact on the global economy and may slow down the currently
forecasted pace of recovery.
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4.2. Federal Deficit and Debt – What are
the Expectations? 
Although  11  years  of  consecutive  federal  surpluses  have  made  achieving 
“balanced budget or better” nearly a habitual situation, budget deficits are far
from  being  a  new  phenomenon  for  Canada.  Both  federal  and  provincial 
governments have experienced prolonged periods of budget deficits at different
points in time over the past three decades. In the case of the federal government,
the latest deficit cycle persisted for 27 years (from 1970-71 to 1996-97 fiscal
years) and was characterized by chronic, large-size budget shortfalls. The
length of the current deficit cycle is naturally not known yet; however, if the
government budget forecast is of any indication, the latest projections suggest
that deficit will persist for at least seven years between 2008-09 and 2014-15
fiscal years (top graph of Figure 9). 
The size of the budgetary balance is influenced by a number of components.
Public debt charges is one of them; and its main peculiarity lies with the fact
that the government has limited influence on the level of the debt charges
which  are  largely  shaped  by  current  interest  rates.  Revenue  and  program
spending are two other primary variables determining the magnitude of the
budgetary balance. Unlike debt charges, budgetary revenue and spending are
directly controlled by the government. 
However, achieving a positive operating balance – the excess of revenues over
program spending – is not always enough to avoid a deficit. For instance, in
the early 1970s, the operating balance remained positive for the first five years
of the deficit cycle but was not large enough to offset debt service charges
(bottom graph of Figure 9). A similar situation occurred in the late 1980s
when the positive margin of the operating balance persisted for 10 years but
still was not able to withstand the mounting debt service charges and the 
negative  consequences  of  global  recession  of  the  early  1990s.  When  the 
relatively  modest  surplus  (0.3%  of  GDP)  was  first  achieved  in  1997-98, 
budgetary revenue had to exceed program spending by 40.1% in order to 
create the surplus. A somewhat similar trend may already be observed in the
projections of the current deficit cycle. Although a surplus is not forecasted
prior to 2015-16, the operating balance is expected to become positive as early
as 2011-12 and account for nearly 2% of GDP in the 2014-15 fiscal years.
Whether or not these expectations may be over-optimistic is discussed later. 
Federal  budget  deficits  are  seen  in  negative  light  primarily  because  they
increase federal public debt which is a mere accumulation of deficits over
time. The prolonged era of federal budget deficits in the 1970s and 1980s
resulted in the federal debt more than tripling (in relative terms) between 1974
and 1995 when it peaked at 68.4% of GDP. Comparatively, the projected
The latest projections
suggest that deficit 




increase in federal debt triggered by the current economic downturn is fairly
mild with the highest level expected to peak at 35.5% in 2010-11 (top graph
of Figure 10). 
Some caveats to measuring the level of public debt are important to note. The
most common measure of the level of federal public debt – debt-to-GDP ratio
– is influenced by the relative growth rates of both deficit and GDP. If deficit
Figure 9 – Federal Budgetary and Operating Balance
Note: The break in series between 1982-83 and 1983-84 fiscal years marks the shift from modified accrual to 
full accrual accounting framework.
Source: Department of Finance Canada (2009). Fiscal Reference Tables, Table 2; Department of Finance 





























































grows slower than GDP, then the relative level of debt (i.e. debt-to-GDP ratio)
declines even though the government still reports a deficit. This was the case
in the early 1970s when for the first 5 years of the deficit cycle, the relative
level of federal debt was declining reaching its lowest of 18.4% in 1974-75 
fiscal year although deficit averaged at 1.5% of GDP over those years. Similarly,
persistent deficits that increase public debt but at a rate equal to that of the 
economic growth will maintain the level of debt-to-GDP indicator unchanged. 
Figure 10 – Federal Debt
Note: The break in series between 1982-83 and 1983-84 fiscal years marks the shift from modified accrual to 
full accrual accounting framework.
Source: Department of Finance Canada (2009). Fiscal Reference Tables, Table 2; Department of Finance 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring public debt relative to GDP allows taking into account the growing
income (i.e. GDP) which forms the basis of servicing the debt. At the same
time,  one  of  the  main  shortcomings  of  this  approach  is  that  it  compares
income over a given period of time against the stock of debt which is to be
repaid over several periods of time. As such, it does not account for a possible
sudden reduction in income. Measuring federal debt per capita and adjusting
it  for  inflation  somewhat  mitigates  this  shortcoming  as  it  shows  the  debt 
burden of each Canadian at any given point of time. As seen from the bottom
graph of Figure 10, the per capita measurement presents a less progressive 
debt reduction and a much sharper increase in the debt level over the budget
forecast horizon.
It is also worth mentioning that even though Canada had experienced strong
fiscal positions for over a decade prior to the 2008 crisis, the starting point of
the current deficit cycle is somewhat weaker than that of the previous cycle
when it comes to the relative level of federal debt. 
4.3. The Main Concern – Are the
Expectations Set Correctly?
A  number  of  factors  may  further  negatively  affect  the  already  weakened 
federal fiscal position. Among those are the work of automatic stabilizers,
contingency risk of liabilities, inaccurate fiscal projections and some traditional
but seemingly forgotten fiscal pressures. These possible ‘add-ons’ are further
discussed. 
Automatic Stabilizers
Automatic stabilizers are usually defined as those elements of fiscal policy
that mitigate output fluctuations by adjusting government revenues and/or
expenditures without discretionary government actions.
59Automatic stabilizers
are  often  seen  as  contributing  to  demand  stabilization  through  mitigating
income shocks on household consumption and business activity. Examples of
automatic stabilizers include corporate and personal income tax, employment
insurance, and income-tested social benefits such as child care tax credit and
guaranteed income supplement for seniors. 
The automatic stabilizers of personal income tax are activated by the progressive
nature of Canada’s tax system which imputes that lower income is taxed at a
lower statutory rate. As an individual’s income declines, the individual pays
less  as  a  proportion  of  their  income  in  direct  taxation.  In  addition,  some
sources of income such as capital gains allow for recognition of losses of the
current and some of the preceding years. In the case of corporate taxation,
The starting point of
the current deficit 
cycle is somewhat
weaker than that of the
previous cycle when it
comes to the relative
level of federal debt
59  Dolls, M. et al (2009). Automatic Stabilizers and Economic Crisis: US vs. Europe, The Institute for the
Study of Labor, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 4310.58
automatic  stabilizers  work  through  the  actuality  that  taxation  is  primarily
based on profits rather than revenues. In a recession, profits tend to fall much
faster than turnover which results in a corporation paying less taxes even
though the economic activity may have decreased only slightly. Recognition
of losses and their carry forward is also built into the corporate taxation. The
works of employment insurance and income-tested benefits are fairly straight-
forward – the frequency and intensity of benefits paid tend to increase as 
individuals’ income is interrupted or declines. 
The impact of automatic stabilizers may be significant, particularly given the
harsh nature of the financial crisis and economic downturn. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the contribution of automatic stabilizers
to  Canada’s  fiscal  balance  amounted  to  0.8%  of  GDP  in  2008  and  will 
contribute some 1.4% of GDP in 2009.
60 These calculations may still be 
underestimating the total of the automatic stabilizers as the computation was
based on changes in the output gap
61 whereas some of the variables that affect
fiscal  balances  are  not  perfectly  correlated  with  output  fluctuations.  In
Canada, such variables may include equity prices, financial sector profits, and
interest and exchange rates. The fall in equity prices may affect revenues
through declines in capital gains and consumption taxation (latter is transmitted
through the reduced wealth effect). The unaccounted effect from financial 
sector profits may come from profits derived from trading activities whereas
the  increase  in  interest  rates  and  exchange  rate  depreciation  may  impose 
additional burden on the debt service. Although country specific estimates of
these additional factors’ contribution to the automatic stabilizers are not available,
IMF estimates that on average, G-20 countries will experience an additional
1.3% of GDP deterioration in fiscal position due to these factors in 2009.
62
Previously described, the work of the automatic stabilizers is linked to
declines in individual income and corporate profits, and increases in number
of persons receiving Employment Insurance benefits. A look at the dynamic
of these components during the past two recessions may then provide some
guidance on the extent to which the use of automatic stabilizers may be solicited
over time during the current economic crisis. 
The longer of the two previous recessions discussed lasted 18 months; however,
the  decline  in  individual  income  and  corporate  profits  compared  to  their 
pre-recession levels was much more persistent. As the top graph of Figure 11
reveals, it took 3 years in the 1980s and 5 years in the 1990s for the total




to 0.8% of GDP in 2008
and 1.4% of GDP in 2009
60  International Monetary Fund (2009). Companion Paper—The State of Public Finances: Outlook and
Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, p. 52.
61  Output gap is understood as the difference between country’s actual and potential GDP, whereas potential
GDP is understood as the highest level of real GDP that could persist for a substantial period without
raising the rate of inflation.
62  International Monetary Fund (2009). Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis, 
IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/13, p. 12-14.59
income of individuals (adjusted for inflation) to return to pre-recession levels.
A  similarly  long  recovery  was  observed  for  corporate  profits.
Concurrently, the total regular Employment Insurance payments (adjusted for
inflation) that were triggered by the 1990s recession were higher than the 
pre-recession levels for 4 years after the initial hike in 1991. 
It took 3 years in the
1980s and 5 years in
the 1990s for the total
income of individuals to
return to pre-recession
levels
Figure 11 – Selected Federal Budget Components 
Note: Top graph: Corporate profit is recognized as profits before taxes of corporations and government 
business enterprises.
Source: Top graph: CANSIM Tables 202-0407, 380-0020, 276-0005 and 326-0021. CGA-Canada 
computation. Bottom graph: Department of Finance Canada (2009). Fiscal Reference Tables, Department of 











































































































































































































































































































Projections of Selected Budgetary Components
2008-09       2009-10      2010-11      2011-12       2012-13      2013-14      2014-15
Corporate Income Tax (LHS)
Employment Insurance Benefits (LHS)
Personal Income Tax (RHS)60
The 5-year projections of such budgetary components as personal and corporate
income taxes and Employment Insurance benefits presented by the federal
government in September 2009 assume a somewhat different trajectory than
past experience would suggest. As seen from the bottom graph of Figure 11,
the government projections anticipate a steady, strong growth in personal and
corporate  income  taxes  as  early  as  the  2010-11  fiscal  year  whereas  the
Employment Insurance benefits payments will see a fairly steep decline over
2010-11 and 2011-12. In fact, the growth in personal income taxes (adjusted
for inflation) is projected to average 4.5% per year between the 2009-10 and
2014-15 fiscal years. This contrasts noticeably with the 3.5% growth rate of
individual income which was observed during 2003-2007 – the most recent
years of the strongest economic growth.
Given the considerations presented above, two points are worthy of repeated
emphasis. First, the current budgetary 5-year projections may not be fully
reflective of the possible impact of the economic stabilizers on the federal 
revenue and spending. If that is the case, the overestimation of revenues and/or
underestimation of expenses may not only increase the deficit in a particular
year  but  also  lead  to  increasing  fiscal  pressures  in  other  years  through
increased debt service charges. Second, should Canada experience a slower
than expected economic recovery, additional expenditure, not incorporated in
the current forecasts, and add-ons to the levels of federal deficit and debt may
be expected. 
Contingent Liabilities and Assets Recovery Rates
Presence of contingent liabilities is one of the key difficulties in determining
the scope of the fiscal consequences of the stimulus measures due to the
uncertainty with the timing and magnitude of the payments associated with
them. In technical terms, contingent liabilities are understood as potential
debts which may become actual financial obligations if certain events occur or
fail to occur.
63 Contingent liabilities are often grouped into liabilities related
to: guarantees by the government; insurance programs; claims and pending
and threatened litigation; contaminated sites; and international organizations.
Although  contingent  liabilities  have  no  immediate  impact  on  government
debt, they may weaken the fiscal balance and impair fiscal sustainability if and
when the guarantee is called upon. Contingent liabilities are known to lead to
so-called “hidden deficits” as such liabilities may increase the level of public
debt which will not be mirrored in the headline level of fiscal deficit.
64
Contingent liabilities may be particularly costly in the event of a crisis. For
instance, recent research concluded that the overall fiscal costs, net of recoveries,
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63  Government of Canada (2009). Public Accounts of Canada 2009, Prepared by the Receiver General for
Canada, p. 1.21.
64  Cebotari, A. (2008). Contingent Liabilities: Issues and Practice, International Monetary Fund, IMF 
Working Paper WP/08/245.61
associated with crisis management of some 40 banking crises episodes over
1970-2007 averaged 13.3% of GDP, with some reaching as high as 55.1% of
GDP.
65 In the case of Canada, IMF’s conservative estimates suggest that the
expected fiscal cost of financial guarantees provided to the banking sector may
be as high as 3.2% of GDP annually over five years. However, this is still
lower than the average cost of 9.7% of GDP per year over five years for 
G-7 economies.
66
Another part of the stimulus package which entails no immediate fiscal cost
for  the  government  is  the  acquisition  of  assets.  The  Insured  Mortgage
Purchase Program which acquired some $64 billion of insured residential
mortgage pools is a good example. At the time of purchase, such assets have
no impact on the fiscal balance unless funded by drawing down cash balances.
Over time, though, the fiscal impact will critically depend on the realizable
value of the acquired assets and/or the extent to which these assets will hold
their value. As accumulated deficit (i.e. public debt) is the difference between
the government’s total liabilities and its financial and non-financial assets, the
decrease in value of assets is reflected directly in the level of debt. As such,
the eventual cost of the stimulus package is subject to significant uncertainties
and depends on the evolution of the financial sector and the economy.
The experience of past crises shows that the recovery rate may vary greatly
even among the countries with similar levels of economic development. For
instance, within five years following the 1991 crisis, Sweden recovered 94%
of the cost of assets acquired by the government through financial support 
during the crisis. The experience of Japan, in turn, was bitter. After five years
following the 1997 crisis, Japan recovered only 1% of assets whereas by 2008
– some 10 years after the crisis – the recovery rate stood at 54%.
67
The analysis conducted by the IMF
68 shows that recovery rates are positively
associated with a country’s per capita income and the “fiscal space” existing
at the beginning of the crisis (i.e. fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio). In turn, the
negative  influence  on  the  recovery  rate  is  brought  by  such  factors  as  the 
occurrence of an exchange rate crisis, the gross fiscal cost of the crisis, and the
economy-in-transition status of the country. If this list of factors is of any 
indication, Canada may score fairly well in terms of recovery rate. 
However, “fairly well” is a relative notion. For instance, the latest of the 
IMF’s estimates suggest that Canada may be among the top 5 countries (out
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65  Laeven, L. and Valencia, F. (2008). Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database, International Monetary
Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/08/224, p. 24.
66  International Monetary Fund (2009). Companion Paper – The State of Public Finances: Outlook and
Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, Table 10.
67  International Monetary Fund (2009). Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis. 
IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/13, p. 10.
68  International Monetary Fund (2009). Companion Paper – The State of Public Finances: Outlook and
Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, p. 39-40. 62
19 advanced economies) in terms of the asset recovery rate. Yet in terms of
numbers, this means only a 59.7% recovery rate for the upfront government
financing  allocated  for  financial  sector  support  (which  is  estimated  to  be 
8.8% of GDP).
69 The recovery rate may further be curbed by the fact that a
number of countries may be attempting to liquidate assets at approximately
the same time. Should the disposition of assets require additional institutional
arrangements, the administrative costs in that arrangement may repress the
recovery rate even further.
Accuracy of Budgetary Forecasts
The accuracy of the federal budgetary forecasts had been questioned on a
number of occasions in the recent past. In 1994, in response to concerns about
the credibility of the forecasting process in which the federal government 
had often underestimated the size of its deficits, the Department of Finance
Canada commissioned an independent, external review of the Department’s
forecasting performance. A similar review was conducted in 2005; however,
at that time the primary motivation for the review was to understand the nature
and causes of the systematic underestimation of the recurring budgetary surpluses. 
The accuracy of budgetary forecasting did not seem to improve considerably
since the earlier review. The federal government continued to register much
larger than expected surpluses in both 2006-07 and 2007-08 fiscal years. It is
highly likely, then, that the high level of uncertainty currently present in the
economy may further erode the accuracy of the budgetary forecasting. The recent
evolution of the budgetary projections supports fairly well that assumption.
The budget forecasts presented in Figure 12 were prepared on two occasions:
the  January  2009  forecast  was  incorporated  in  Budget  2009  whereas  the
September  2009  forecast  was  presented  in  the  Update  of  Economic  and 
Fiscal  Projections  released  by  the  government  in  the  fall  of  2009.  The 
forecasts  were  prepared  some  7  months  apart  over  which  the  economic 
situation started to stabilize, and the forecasts of economic growth and global
economic recovery improved significantly. Contrarily, the budgetary forecasts
deteriorated. Discrepancies in deficit forecasts, for instance, reached as much
as 1% of GDP in certain years. The discrepancies in the forecasts of the level
of federal debt were even higher and amounted to 5% of GDP in 2012-13 and
2013-14 fiscal years. Taking into account that as recently as November
2008 the government was forecasting 5 years of recurring surpluses,
70 further
revisions  to  the  current  projections  of  the  federal  fiscal  balance  are  quite 
possible in the near future. 
Further revisions to 
the current projections
of the federal fiscal 
balance are quite 
possible in the near
future
69  International Monetary Fund (2009). Companion Paper – The State of Public Finances: Outlook and
Medium-Term Policies after the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, Table 3.
70  Department of Finance Canada (2008). Economic and Fiscal Statement – Protecting Canada’s Future,
Table 3.3.63
Aging Population
Slowing population growth and a shifting age structure are two well recognized
dynamics of Canada’s future over the next three to four decades. The so-called
“double-aging” arising from the sharp decline in fertility rates and falling rates
of mortality will continue to change significantly the ratio of elderly to young
age population.
As the age structure of the population changes, so too does government 
expenditures and the expectation is that the public funding may experience
some financial relief from the smaller size of the young population requiring
Slowing population
growth and a shifting




Figure 12 – Budgetary Projections – Selected Components
Source: Department of Finance Canada (2009). The Budget Plan, Table 4.4; Department of Finance Canada 
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education and health services, but also an amplified pressure on the health care
system and increased honouring of the social insurance commitments due to
the aging of baby-boomers. The impact of the expectedly increased budget
spending requirements will further be amplified by the fact that the primary
revenue earning population (i.e. those in their mid-thirties to mid-sixties) will
decline and may affect negatively the level and stream of budget revenues.
Over  the  past  years,  a  substantial  body  of  literature  has  been  developed
analysing the fiscal implications of an aging population.
71 One of the often cited
projections conducted by the Organisation for Co-operation and Economic
Development (OECD) suggests that by 2050, total age-related spending will
increase by 8.7 percentage points compared to the level registered in 2000.
72
In other words, while age-related government spending accounted for 17.9%
of GDP in 2000, it will amount to 26.6% of GDP in 2050.
Some researchers
73 suggest that deferred tax payments on the funds accumulated
by Canadians in their RRSPs and RPPs may be sufficient to offset the fiscal
pressures associated with increased the population aging. However, the sharp
decline  in  values  of  most  of  financial  assets  during  the  2008  financial 
crisis weakens the relevance of this argument at least in the short and 
medium-terms. 
4.4. What Should We Do with the Federal Debt? 
Public  debt  as  a  phenomenon  bears  certain  benefits  as  well  as  negative 
implications. The benefits of government debt include the role that it plays in
enhancing  the  liquidity  of  households.  Government  debt  may  provide  a 
relatively  safe  saving  instrument  which  smoothes  household  consumption
over time. It may, as well, reduce household exposure to idiosyncratic shocks
by  raising  the  overall  private  net  asset  position  and  easing  households’ 
borrowing constraints.
74 The presence of these benefits is one of the reasons
why countries seldom consider reduction of public debt to zero.
The most often cited negative implication of public debt is decreased national
savings which leads to increased net foreign indebtedness and a lower capital
stock due to high risk premium on interest rates and lower private consumption.
71  See, for instance, Robson, W. (2007). Time and Money – The Challenge of Demographic Change and
Government Finance in Canada, C.D. Howe Institute, Backgrounder No. 109; Jackson, H. and Matier, C.
(2002). Public Finance Implications of Population Aging: An Update, Department of Finance Canada,
Working Paper 2003-03; Brimacombe, G.G. et al (2001). The Future Cost of Health Care in Canada –
2000 to 2020, The Conference Board of Canada.
72  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001). Fiscal Implications of Aging: Projections
of Age-Related Spending, OECD Economic Outlook no. 69, Table VI.3. 
73  See, for instance, M￩rette, M. (2002). The Bright Side: A Positive View on the Economics of Aging, 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, Choices, Vol. 8, no. 1.
74  James, S. and Karam, P. (2001). The Role of Government Debt in a World of Incomplete Financial 
Markets, Department of Finance Canada, Working Paper 2001-01.
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Debt also has an adverse effect on wealth distribution and may encourage an
increasingly distortive structure of the tax system as well as crowding out of
capital through higher interest rates and lower private consumption. 
Economic literature does not offer a conclusive answer to the question regarding
the optimal level of government debt and a number of theories co-exist on this
matter. One of the extreme theories suggests that the size of the debt does not
impose any consequences on the allocation of resources as long the debt is
either stable or grows at a sustainable pace. However, this approach is associated
with strict theoretical assumptions that seldom hold in real life. The presence
of liquidity constraints and/or distortive taxation leads to a trade off between
financing government spending through debt or taxes. As such, a more moderate
approach recommends achieving and maintaining a certain optimal fiscal balance.
This can be done either by keeping tax rates relatively constant and thus 
minimizing inter-temporal tax distortions, or through maximizing intergener-
ational equity by choosing levels of debt that would place even burden on the
capital stock of the current and the future generations. Another set of theories
focus more on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of government debt
and suggest that the optimum level of debt is positively linked to the effectiveness
of debt in smoothing out private consumption and negatively to the crowding
out effect of private investments that is associated with debt.
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Moreover, maximization of social welfare – an important element of debt
reduction – relies on optimizing such competing objectives as equity and 
efficiency between different social groups and across generations. As such,
determining the optimal level of debt as it pertains to a particular country may
also depend on the set of social and economic values commonly accepted by
that country. 
As was seen in Section 4.2 (see, for instance, top chart of Figure 10), the level
of Canada’s federal debt has improved significantly in recent years and the
current  situation  as  well  as  the  five-year  forecasts  by  no  means  pose 
question regarding government solvency. History provides ample examples of
situations  when  countries  with  much  higher  levels  of  public  debt  have 
successfully advanced their economies. For instance, such wealthy countries
as the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan had all, at one point in
time or another, a public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 100% (in the case of the
UK, the ratio exceeded 250% in the aftermath of the WWII).
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Similarly, the fear that public debt puts an upward pressure on interest rates
may be overstressed somewhat. The results of the empirical analysis undertaken
for OECD countries show that one percentage point increase in deficit-to-GDP
75  International Monetary Fund (2000). Canada: Selected Issues, Country Report No. 00/34, p. 52-53.
76  International Monetary Fund (2009). The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies
after the 2008 Crisis, Fiscal Affairs Department, Figure 10.
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ratio is associated with 10 basis points increase in nominal long-term interest
rates. However, the influence of the debt-to-GDP ratio on long-term interest
rates is positive only for countries with the initial debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding
100%.
77 When effects of fiscal policy are isolated from other factors affecting
interest rates (e.g. business cycle and varying quality of budget expenditures),
the research results still show a fairly mild influence of public debt on the
interest rates. In the U.S., for instance, a one percentage point increase in the
projected debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to raise the 10-year bond rate expected
to prevail in the future by about 4 to 5 basis points.
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Consideration of the economic theory and the results of the empirical studies
discussed above do not transmute an alarming notion regarding the increasing
public debt; however, reflection on the practical implications may be different.
Unless the interest rates are falling, rising public debt causes the debt service
charges  to  consume  an  increasingly  larger  proportion  of  revenues  which 
otherwise could be directed to other social and economic priorities. 
Moreover, the rise in public debt represents an increase in intergenerational
transfers of costs to the future generations affecting intergenerational equity;
particularly so because associated benefits do not transfer in corollary fashion
to the costs and future generations effectively cannot participate in the decision
making. As seen from the top graph of Figure 13, the bell shape of the curve
formed by the interest ratio is more skewed towards the future compared to the
curve depicting deficits.
It is also worth mentioning that the interest rates paid by the government on
its debt declined noticeably over the late 1980s and 1990s contributing to the
reduction of debt servicing payments. The starting point of the current deficit
cycle is very different with interest rates being at a 30-year low with little help
being expected from them in terms of easing the debt burden of the federal
government (bottom graph of Figure 13). 
Summing up the discussion, several points are worth noting. First, the recovery
of the pre-recession levels of living standards (measured as GDP per capita)
may  take  several  times  longer  than  the  duration  of  the  recession  itself.
Canada’s recovery from the current (2008-2009) recession may further be
aggravated by a number of factors. Second, the starting point of the current
deficit cycle is somewhat weaker than that of the previous cycle and a number
of factors may further aggravate this situation. Third, certain ‘add-ons’ to the
currently projected levels of federal deficit and debt may be expected. Such
77  Ardagna, S. et al (2004). Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for
OECD Countries, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4661.
78  Laubach, T. (2004). New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Deficits and Debt, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, p. 2.
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add-ons may channel through the work of economic stabilizers, contingent 
liabilities  and  low  recovery  rates  of  the  acquired  assets.  Forth,  economic 
theory does not offer a clear benchmark regarding the optimal level of debt. In
practical terms, though, increasing debt service charges reduce government’s
flexibility to allocate revenues to carefully chosen priorities.
Figure 13 – Debt Service Charges and Interest Rates
Note: Top graph: Interest ratio is public debt charges expressed as a percentage of budgetary revenues
Source: Top graph: Department of Finance Canada (2009). Fiscal Reference Tables. 
































































































































































































































































































































































The analysis of the preceding sections has intended to provide valuable insight
into the three distinct elements which form one logical continuum. Starting
with  the  identification  of  components  of  the  overall  economic  stimulus 
package implemented by the federal government during the 2008 economic
crisis, consideration has shifted to the least invulnerable stimulus measure, i.e.
support to the auto industry. This followed with a discussion of the possible
implications of stimulus measures and other selected factors on the level of
federal debt. During this examination, a number of contentions have been
exposed. 
One particular stimulus measure – support to the auto industry – stands
out in terms of the level of concern associated with its quality
As may be expected, a number of factors were fairly ‘extraordinary’ regarding
the overall stimulus package introduced by the federal government during the
economic crisis. Some of the measures represent an aggressive intervention in
the areas where the government is present only moderately or not at all (i.e.
credit easing). Other measures were in more traditional areas such as taxation
or infrastructure development but their price tag exceeded the range typically
seen in previous years. However, when validated against such criteria as 
accessibility, merit base, disclosure of possible fiscal impacts and parliamentary
approval, these measures scored at least “average”.
The rescue of the auto industry, in turn, fairs less favourably. The possible 
negative fiscal implication of the loans were not reflected in the initial budgetary
forecasts; nor was the Parliament given opportunity to debate and influence
the structure of the bailout beyond the very general information presented in
the budget documents. Moreover, the full amount of the financial support was
provided on a non-merit basis to a very narrow range of recipients. 
There is reason to doubt that the financial support to the auto industry
was appropriate to its size and importance to the Canadian economy 
A number of indicators may be used to assess the importance of the industry.
Among those are the industry’s contributions to total GDP, the number of workers
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employed in the industry, the impact that change in industry production may
induce in other industries, and to the economy as a whole. Although the
Canadian auto industry is a technologically advanced, well paying employer
to thousands of workers, when compared to the whole Canadian economy, the
auto industry represents only a small part. 
The heavy concentration of the auto industry in only few geographical locations
should  be  given  proper  recognition.  However,  a  heavy  dependence  of  a
multi-thousand inhabitant community on one big employer may rather be seen
as a faulty industrial policy than a justification for rescue. Similarly, overt
favouring  of  a  highly  capital-concentrated  industry  over  fairly  dispersed
industries that experience economic difficulties of similar magnitude does
arouse curiosity. 
There is reason to question the sufficiency of government transparency
and  accountability  in  carrying  out  its  financial  commitment  to  the 
auto industry
The absence of clearly stated objectives when allocating large sums of public
funds, changing rational for actions, and admitted adoption of U.S. policy do
little  to  bolster  the  confidence  of  the  electorate.  Although  stressful  and 
challenging times, Canada will be well served to maintain its doctrine of best
practice and to foster government accountability and transparency. To that
ends also, consistency should be maintained in disclosures that relate to the
Economic Action Plan. 
The combination of economic uncertainty and the already existing fiscal 
pressures  of  aging  population  may  exacerbate  significantly  the  actual
levels of federal deficit and debt
The large number of stimulus measures (particularly those associated with
credit easing) was provided in the form of loans, guarantees and investments.
As such, their potential impact is not fully reflected in the forecasts of the 
federal budgetary components. Contingency risk of liabilities, recovery rate of
assets acquired by the government, additional revenue losses, and increased
spending due to automatic stabilizers may affect the level of federal deficit and
debt in a way currently not reflected in the fiscal projections. Additional fiscal
requirements  associated  with  the  aging  of  the  Canadian  population  will
impose elevated fiscal pressures on the federal budget and these pressures will
persist regardless of whether a positive or a negative scenario of economic
developments materializes. 71
A  balanced  approach  to  federal  deficit  reduction  and  federal  debt 
stabilization may be desirable
Economic theory does not provide clear guidance on the optimal level of 
public debt in the economy. Although the possible economic implications of
increasing levels of debt are well articulated, there is little agreement as to
whether those implications are of positive or negative or neutral nature to the
economy. Given this and Canada’s enviously strong fiscal position compared
to that of other advanced economies, the temptation may be to loosen fiscal
policy allowing moderate deficits to persist. Such attitudes are best avoided as
increasing over time public debt service charges may diminish the government’s
degree of freedom in identifying and attending to key economic and social 
priorities, including the fiscal pressures associated with a shifting demography
and the like.7273
The development of effective public policy on some of the issues exposed
throughout this paper can admittedly be a daunting task. This is particularly so
because  the  economic  crises,  stimulus  packages,  and  government  budgets
embody extremely broad concepts having an infinite number of interconnections
and likewise having an endless number of implications. In search of the right
balance, decisions must reconcile and reflect the importance of national values,
a variety of stakeholder interests, and recognition that Canada is an open 
economy constituting only a small part of a large, dynamic, and interrelated
global system.
Putting the Fiscal House in Order
It  is  definitely  incorrect  to  characterize  the  state  of  the  federal  budget  as 
disorderly.  Canada  entered  the  current  economic  downturn  with  a  strong
record of federal budget surpluses and one of the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios
among the G-7 countries. The current projections also suggest that Canada
will remain a ‘success story’ among the advanced countries when it comes to
public debt. In fact, Canada is projected to maintain the lowest debt-to-GDP
ratio in 2014 as well.
79 However, the relatively recent experience of Sweden
shows how easily the fiscal gains of previous years may yield to unsustainable
shortfalls of the current years. A systemic financial crises that broke out in
Sweden in 1991, wiped out the country’s pre-crisis surplus of nearly 3.8% of
GDP replacing it with a whopping deficit amounting to 11.6% of GDP just
two years after the crisis.
80 
In order for the government to maintain its fiscal house while concurrently
promoting  economic  growth  and  improvement  of  living  standards  of
Canadians, the following four elements are deemed to be essential: (i) setting
of clear fiscal targets; (ii) avoidance of increasing economically distortive
taxes;  (iii)  increase  in  government  accountability  and  transparency;  and, 
(iv) support for development of social finance and enterprise. 
73
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79  Based on International Monetary Fund (2009). Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial
Crisis, IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/13, Table 5.2.
80  Reinhart, C.M. (2009). The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Financial Crises, VOX, January 26,
2009. Available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2877, accessed October 9, 2009.74
Set Clear Fiscal Targets
Fiscal rules are typically designed to maintain fiscal discipline as they are 
set to keep certain budgetary indicators within set limits or levels. Generally,
those fiscal rules that combine budget balance rules and expenditure rules 
are found to be more effective than those referring only to the general budget
balance. 
Prior to Budget 2009 budget, federal government fiscal policy incorporated a
combination of short, medium, and long term fiscal rules. Specifically, the
budgetary framework included such fiscal targets as achieving a balanced 
budget or better in any given fiscal year, to reach a 25% debt-to-GDP ratio by
2011-12, to maintain the growth in program spending at the rate of growth in
nominal GDP, and to eliminate net total government debt by 2021.
81
Budget 2009 silently abandoned fiscal rules suggesting instead that the federal
government debt-to-GDP ratio of 2013-14 is projected to rival 2008-09 levels.
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While defining fiscal rules in a time of financial and economic fragility may
hardly  be  expected,  the  current  environment  of  economic  stabilizing  and
desired recovery strongly encourage the federal government to commit to 
fiscal prudence and to clearly define fiscal targets and timeframes. Articulating
principles and strategies that will facilitate the path and manage the schedule
are also essential – particularly in areas where temporary spending (extraordinary
stimulus) is concerned.  
Avoid Increasing Economically Distortive Taxes
Returning to a surplus, or at least a balanced budget position, over the medium-
term may require the federal government to take contracting measures – the
choice from which is very basic – tax increases and/or spending restraints. 
Gaining control over the previous deficit cycle that ended in 1997 was primarily
achieved through structural reforms to the Employment Insurance Program
and reduction in other forms of federal spending that disproportionately 
disadvantaged interprovincial transfers.
83 These measures resulted in lower
benefit rates and increased entrance requirements for the Employment Benefit
Program and complex adjustment processes on the parts of provinces. As 
similar  strategies  may  be  of  limited  desirability  during  the  current  deficit
cycle, the circumstances may call for certain adjustments in the tax system. A
word of caution is deemed appropriate.
81  Department of Finance Canada (2008). The Budget Plan, p. 65
82  Department of Finance Canada (2009). The Budget Plan, p. 28.
83  Dyck, D. (2003). Fiscal Redistribution in Canada, 1994-2000, Department of Finance Canada, Working
Paper 2003-22.75
Over the years of strong economic growth experienced by Canada during 
the early and mid 2000s, the public policy debate had clearly identified and
rationalized the need to reform the Canadian tax system. The achievement of
that goal was primarily envisioned through taxation which causes significant
distortion onto the economy and which diminishes incentives for individuals
and businesses to engage in productive activity. The current economic down-
turn did not reverse the need for such an evolution of the tax system; however,
the means for achieving this goal have been reduced significantly.
Rapid growth has been a key factor in attaining sustained improvements in the
public debt-to-GDP ratio. Strong growth has also been a key source of reducing
the nominal amount of public debt. Finding the optimal solution of how to 
balance the possible need to tighten the budget and still ensure that the fiscal
and budget measures do not impede the economic growth may, to say the least,
be a challenge. Even in those circumstances, though, the government should
strive to avoid increasing economically distortive taxes such as individual and
corporate income taxes – and in fact continue to pursue more reductions.
Increase Government Accountability and Transparency
Insufficient transparency within the government can have a detrimental impact
on the management of resources within the government. It may also erode the
strong level of public trust the federal government currently enjoys and 
jeopardize  government’s  ability  to  gain  public  support  in  implementing 
difficult decisions regarding increasing tax burden and reduced levels of services
which may be necessitated by the fiscal pressures. The Certified General
Accountants Association continues to advocate for continued improvement in
public transparency and accountability. The government financing to the auto
industry and the expected spike in liabilities and contingencies assumed by the
federal government will only heighten the call for increased disclosure. 
Moreover,  the  Association  contends  that  the  opportunity  for  broad-based
adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs) is
before us. Supported by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC),
governments worldwide would be well served to follow the same high standards
of financial reporting as their private counterparts. Importantly, a concerted
move to IPSASs is deemed critical to improving government transparency,
accountability,  and  credibility;  especially  in  light  of  the  unprecedented
takeovers,  lending,  guarantees,  and  bailouts  of  major  market  institutions,
banks, and companies that have taken place in different parts of the world.
Currently, a number of prominent international organizations including the
United Nations, NATO and the OECD already conform to such standards.  76
Support Development of Social Finance and Enterprise
Canada’s modern welfare state continues to rely heavily on the not-for-profit
sector to deliver state-funded public services; however, the size of funding
provided by the federal government to the not-for-profit sector is much lower
than it once was (for instance, in the 1960s and the 1980s). In the 1990s, the
government adjusted its levels of spending and began reducing or eliminating
some of the programs and services, while also reducing the amount of income
support provided to individuals. This increased dramatically the demand for
social services while concurrently impeding the capacity of the not-for-profit
sector to provide these services.
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As federal government program spending may come under increasing pressure
for additional spending cuts, the not-for-profit sector’s capacity to satisfy the
still increasing demand for social services may further be tested. In these
regards, the government is encouraged to consider adopting a holistic approach
to supporting the development of so-called social enterprise (or social finance).
Social  enterprises  are  organizations  that  are  driven  by  social  mission  and
engage in business activities of trading goods or services for a social purpose.
They  often  use  blended  value  business  models  that  combine  a  revenue-
generating business with a social-value-generating structure. An increasing
presence of such entities in the economy may mitigate the seemingly opposing
veracities of increased demand for public services and corresponding inability
to satisfy that demand. 
Diversifying Canadian Economy
Canada is a small open economy with export accounting for some 40% of
Canada’s GDP. However, the overwhelming majority of this trade (86.9%
85)
takes place with the U.S. Although historical and geographical links make
Canada and the U.S. mutually valuable economic partners, such basic lack of
diversification makes Canada uncomfortably dependent on the U.S. as its market. 
The strong Canada-U.S. economic integration has also been observed in areas
other than trade. For instance, more than 60% of foreign direct investments
come to Canada from the U.S. Tight economic relations are critically important
in the increasingly globalized world; however, the excessive one-country 
orientation may also be harmful for the host country’s economic autonomy,
particularly in industries of high concentration. The rescue of the auto industry
proves to be an excellent example. The federal government had to allocate an
84  Hall. M. et al (2005). The Canadian Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective. Imagine
Canada, p. 23
85  Web portal of Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters. Available at http://www.cme-mec.ca/national/
template_na.asp?p=3, accessed October 23, 2009.77
equivalent of 8.1% of its overall direct program spending to two private
companies due to an implied threat to withdraw Canadian operations in the
absence of the funding.
Technology transfer and spill-over, job creation, and human capital enhancement
are well recognized, important and valuable benefits of the foreign direct
investments. However, the government’s strategy should also be intensified 
in ensuring open and fair trade in international markets other than U.S. This
may  include  negotiating  of  multilateral,  regional,  and  bilateral  trade 
agreements  that  eliminate  both  tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  in 
international markets. In this regard, the recently intensified work towards a
new Canada-European Union Trade and Investment Enhancement Agreement
is commendable. 
As for the domestic market, the opportunity for government should come not
only  from  restoring  the  competitiveness  of  firms  but  rather  in  providing 
displaced  workers  with  the  assistance  and  skills  they  need  to  secure  new
employment prospects. 7879
Insured Mortgage Purchase Program (IMPP)
The federal government will purchase up to $125 billion of insured residential
mortgage pools through reverse auctions administered by Canada Mortgage
and Housing Corporation and normally held once or twice a month. A schedule
of planned auctions is published before each quarter. At each auction, funds
are allocated beginning with the highest bid until the amount of available
funding is depleted. Only mortgages that are pooled under the National Housing
Act Mortgage Backed Securities program are eligible. All qualified issuers of
mortgage-backed securities under the National Housing Act Mortgage Backed
Securities program may participate. Other entities may participate indirectly
through  a  qualified  issuer.  To  date  (October  2009),  16  different  financial 
institutions have participated directly in the IMPP, including banks, non-bank
deposit-taking institutions, and life insurance companies. 
Business Credit Availability Program (BCAP)
BCAP will provide at least $5 billion in additional loans and other forms 
of credit support and enhancement at market rates to businesses with viable
business models whose access to financing would otherwise be restricted. By
working in close cooperation with private sector financial institutions, this
program will fill gaps in market access and lever additional lending by private
sector institutions where joint participation facilitates private action.
Canadian Secured Credit Facility (CSCF)
CSCF will purchase up to $12 billion of term asset-backed securities (ABS)
backed by loans and leases on vehicles and equipment. CSCF funds will be
offered on a “first-come, first-served” basis until March 31, 2010 to provide
continued support for participants in the auto and equipment financing sectors.
The funds will be available to large and small companies alike. All ABS which
are backed by assets originated by Large Enterprise Originators and Small
Enterprise Originators must be rated AAA by any two of DBRS Limited,
Fitch, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., or Standard & Poor’s Rating Services. 
New 10-year Canada Mortgage Bonds (CMB)
The program intends to launch a new quarterly CMB with 10-year maturity to
attract a broader pool of investors to culminate to $10 billion in supplementary,
cost-effective  funding  for  financial  institutions  and  mortgage  lenders.
Homebuyers and housing industry will benefit through improved access to
lower cost mortgages.
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Loans to auto industry
See Section 3.1 for description of the interim loans to the auto industry
Home Renovation Tax Credit (HRTC)
HRTC is a non-refundable tax credit based on eligible expenses for improvements
to house, condo or cottage. It can be claimed on 2009 income tax return. It
applies  to  eligible  purchases  made  after  January  27,  2009,  and  before
February 1, 2010. HRTC applies to eligible expenses of more than $1,000, but
not more than $10,000, resulting in a maximum non-refundable tax credit
of $1,350. 
Infrastructure Stimulus Fund (ISF)
The federal government has established a new $4 billion ISF that provides
funding to provincial, territorial and municipal construction-ready infrastructure
rehabilitation projects. Funding is available for two years for projects that
begin during the 2009 and 2010 construction seasons and can be completed
before March 31, 2011. The full $4 billion will be distributed in fiscal years
2009-10 and 2010-11. Projects will focus largely on the rehabilitation of existing
assets such as water, wastewater, public transit, highways, roads, culture,
parks, trails and municipal buildings.
Personal Income Tax Relief
The basic personal amount has been increased to $10,320 in 2009 from $9,600
in  2008,  allowing  individuals  to  earn  more  income  before  paying  federal
income  tax.  The  top  of  the  first  personal  income  tax  bracket  has  been
increased to $40,726 in 2009 from $37,885 in 2008, allowing more income to
be taxed at the lowest 15-percent rate, rather than the 22-percent rate. The top
of the second personal income tax bracket has been increased to $81,452 in
2009 from $75,769 in 2008, allowing more income to be taxed at the 22-percent
rate, rather than the 26-percent rate. These measures will provide tax relief of
$470 million in 2008-09, $1,885 million in 2009-10 and $1,950 million in
2010-11.
Loans to Municipalities 
Budget 2009 will make available up to $2 billion over two years in direct, 
low-cost loans to municipalities through the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation.  These  low-cost  loans  will  significantly  decrease  the  cost  of 
borrowing for municipalities, and can be used by them to fund their contribution
for cost-shared federal infrastructure programming.
Improving Infrastructure at Universities and Colleges
Budget 2009 provides up to $2 billion to support deferred maintenance and
repair projects at post-secondary institutions. Preference will be given to projects81
at  universities  that  can  improve  the  quality  of  research  and  development
at the institution. The funds under this initiative will be managed by Industry
Canada, with 70 per cent of the funding dedicated to university infrastructure
and the remaining 30 per cent for infrastructure at colleges. Allocation will 
be based on project merit and readiness. The funds will pay for up to half of 
project costs, levering an equivalent amount from other partners.8283
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